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COMMENTARY
POLICING AND “BLUELINING”
Aya Gruber
ABSTRACT
In this Commentary written for the Frankel Lecture
symposium on police killings of Black Americans, I explore the
increasingly popular claim that racialized brutality is not a
malfunction of policing but its function. Or, as Paul Butler
counsels, “Don’t get it twisted—the criminal justice system ain’t
broke. It’s working just the way it’s supposed to.” This claim
contradicts the conventional narrative, which remains largely
accepted, that the police exist to vindicate the community’s
interest in solving, reducing, and preventing crime. A perusal of
the history of organized policing in the United States, however,
reveals that it was never mainly about interdicting crime. From
its inception in the nineteenth century, organized policing served
the social, political, and economic priorities of empowered groups,
from supporting Southern agrarian capitalist interests by
imposing de facto slavery on emancipated Blacks to bolstering
Northern industrialization by oppressing immigrant laborers.
Afterward, police forces grew in response not to spikes in gardenvariety crimes but to political campaigns and cultural anxieties.
And today, it remains contested whether current policing
practices—especially street policing—function to alleviate, rather
than exacerbate, crime problems.

 Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I give a heartfelt thank you
to my dear friends, Frankel Lecturer Angela Onwuachi-Willig and co-respondent Dean
Tamara Lawson. I am also grateful to the organizers of the Lecture, in particular Priyanka
Kasnavia and Erin Horan Mendez, and the Houston Law Review editors. Peter Selimos and
Ariane Frosh provided excellent research assistance.
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While policing’s crime-reduction success is questionable, one
obvious, tremendous success has been its control of race, space,
and place. Police draw blue lines around Black neighborhoods—
just as banks drew their red lines—designating them as high-risk,
pathological spaces. Police use aggressive stop and frisks, intense
surveillance, and military-style home raids to keep the people in
their spatial and social place. Brutality is the business of policing,
reinforced in recruitment, training, and practice. I conclude that
because racialized brutality is integral to policing, reformers
should not primarily focus on incarcerating specific bad cops who
draw headlines. The “bad apple” narrative casts racist violence as
individual and deviant, rather than institutional and structural,
and undermines the current promising, if glacial, movement
toward dismantling policing as we know it.
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I. INTRODUCTION

We are in the midst of a sea change.
During the summer of 2020, millions of people around the
world took to the streets to express their outrage at the horrific
police killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Daniel Prude, and
too many others. People watched aghast as the militarized police
and federal paramilitaries trained their weapons of war on
peaceful protesters and disappeared civilians in a manner more
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befitting a dictatorship than the United States.1 Progressives were
dismayed that police and prosecutors continued to fill overcrowded
and unsanitary prisons where COVID-19 raged, thereby imposing
an unofficial death penalty on thousands of detainees, many of
whom had not yet been tried for misdemeanors. 2 All this
galvanized a shift in mindset, and no longer did people regard
these events as disconnected points of pain. Rather, they stepped
back, and Seurat-like, a picture emerged with each point a
component of our intolerable system of racialized mass
incarceration.3
In the past, most commentators characterized police brutality
as a matter of individual racist and sadistic bad cops, and many
still do.4 Progressive carceral critics, including criminologists and
law professors, have accordingly advocated for modest procedural
reforms of policing and the penal system.5 But today, an increasing
number of experts argue that changes at the margins that leave
untouched the oppressive structure of policing and punishment,
such as body cameras, implicit bias training, and data-driven
practices, are simply not enough. In fact, ineffective and marginal
reforms can bolster policing institutions by accruing to them
1. See Benjamin Fearnow, Pelosi Calls Out Trump Admin Over Portland Unrest: ‘We
Live in a Democracy, Not a Banana Republic,’ NEWSWEEK (July 19, 2020, 10:02 AM), https://
www.newsweek.com/pelosi-calls-out-trump-admin-over-portland-unrest-we-live-democrac
y-not-banana-republic-1518902 [https://perma.cc/8VDE-JNAP].
2. Katie Park & Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons,
MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-lookat-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/ME5A-J9EJ] (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:30 PM); Timothy
Williams et al., ‘Jails Are Petri Dishes’: Inmates Freed as the Virus Spreads Behind Bars,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us/coronavirus-prisons-ja
ils.html [https://perma.cc/ZP6Q-UZ4Z]; see Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass
Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.p
risonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/2UDM-SQDC]; Michael Lyle, ‘No
Outrage. No Concern. No Action. Just More Silence.’, NEV. CURRENT (Nov. 20, 2020), https://
www.nevadacurrent.com/2020/11/20/no-outrage-no-concern-no-action-just-more-silence/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/HD9M-F9PQ].
3. See generally David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 27, 28–29, 33–34, 46, 50 (2011).
4. See Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 49–50) (on file with author) (describing the agenda to
prosecute police and how it communicates that brutality is an individual act of deviance).
Such narratives are consistent with liberal mainstream views of racial discrimination. See
KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT, at xiii, xv (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“Along with the
suppression of explicit white racism (the widely celebrated aim of civil rights reform), the
dominant legal conception of racism as a discrete and identifiable act of ‘prejudice based on
skin color’ . . . .”).
5. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON
AMERICA 3–4 (2014); infra Part IV (criticizing this tinkering from within).
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money and thwarting more substantial interventions.6 After the
events of the summer, many Black Lives Matter protesters and
others came to see the criminal system’s tendency to wound,
control, and thus maintain the subordinate status of people of
color, not as a malfunction but as the system’s function.7
In this essay, I have the fortunate task of responding to Dean
Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s Frankel Lecture, From “Lynching as
Status Quo” to the New Status Quo. I am delighted to engage the
work of my friend and colleague, who is a luminary in the field of
racial justice. Onwuachi-Willig persuasively illustrates a pattern
of injustice that has been on repeat play with tragic regularity
from the days of Jim Crow and before, involving state and societal
tolerance for racist violence. Drawing on the theory of cultural
trauma developed by sociologist Kai Erickson, 8 she heartwrenchingly describes how Black Americans experience intense,
long-lasting, and damaging pain and trauma caused by repeatedly
viewing state actors ignore, tolerate, and glorify state and quasistate brutality against Black people. Dean Onwuachi-Willig
illustrates in exacting detail how the brutal Emmett Till and
Trayvon Martin killings, separated by over a half-century, both
clearly reflect this recurring pattern of injustice.9
I agree with Dean Onwuachi-Willig’s analysis about the
ubiquity and depth of racial inequality in society generally and in
policing particularly. We agree that many White communities
take pains to maintain homogenous racial spaces by using private
patrollers like George Zimmerman and official police patrols, and
exclusionary economic and social practices.10 We agree that
implicit and explicit biases, personal frames of reference, and
cultural mythologies render many people blindly trusting of law
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part III; Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice
Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 273, 310 (2018) (“[Contemporary ideological left criticism]
raises questions about all aspects of the criminal system and the political economy in which
it is embedded. It sounds not in the language of small-bore solutions or narrow, pragmatic
fixes, but in terms of sweeping systemic critique.”).
8. KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 11–12, 136 (1976).
9. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of Awakening to Racism: Did the Tragic
Killing of George Floyd Result in Cultural Trauma for Whites?, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 829–
830, 835–36 (2021); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of the Routine: Lessons
on Cultural Trauma from the Emmett Till Verdict, 34 SOCIO. THEORY 335, 353 (2016)
[hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, Trauma of the Routine].
10. See infra Section III.A; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of
Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102
IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1181–82 (2017).
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enforcement and skeptical of Black innocence. We agree that the
George Floyd protests may have been a tipping point for a number
of White Americans, and the newfound convergence against racist
police brutality might portend a better future. However,
Onwuachi-Willig, like many racial justice seekers, emphasizes the
need to hold individual police and private actors accountable
through criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment.11 To
be sure, for many years, most Americans,12 including Black
Americans, have understood justice as the incarceration of
individuals deemed responsible for harm, even if that
incarceration is within our racist, overbroad, and inhumane mass
imprisonment system.13
However, racialized police violence is but one facet of an
American carceral state preoccupied with inflicting pain on Black
and Brown bodies. Policing is the legacy of Reconstruction-era
penal policies critical to the oppression of formerly enslaved Black
Americans. 14 Policing and the punishment system are primary
mechanisms by which the government and powerful private actors
socially control the masses, perpetuate White supremacy, and
maintain the minimal size of the welfare state.15 As such, the cycle
of racist police violence and state toleration identified by
Onwuachi-Willig is not a miscalibration of the carceral system but
endemic to it.16 And diverting more resources to that very system
in exchange for the prosecution of select racist and murderous
officers—a costly bargain—is unlikely to break the cycle.17
Racialized police violence is both institutional and structural.
I use the term “institutional” to denote that from the very
inception of organized American law enforcement, racialized and
classed social control was an essential part of what it means to

11.
See Onwuachi-Willig, Trauma of the Routine, supra note 9, at 353.
12. I use “American” colloquially, referring to people that reside in the United States
either permanently or for a significant period of time.
13. See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal
Stand Your Ground, 68 U. MIA. L. REV. 961, 966–67 (2014) [hereinafter Race to Incarcerate]
(describing a “punitive impulse, deeply entrenched in the American psyche, that leads even
left-leaning racial justice proponents occasionally to hastily embrace proposals that
augment the very police and prosecutorial power they otherwise criticize”).
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV; Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 55) (discussing the broader
carceral impacts of the cop-prosecution program).
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“police.”18 Of course, we might imagine a brigade of friendly, raceneutral, nonviolent service providers—something like the Red
Cross—but such a vision is distinctly not one of policing. I use the
term “structural” to denote that racial inequality and brutal
violence are embedded in and reinforced by the organization,
training, and accepted practices of the police and their supporting
criminal law actors. 19 This structural analysis stands in
counterdistinction to the common refrain that police brutality is
the product of “bad apples” or good apples who “chok[ed],” as
President Trump put it.20 Given the institutional and structural
nature of racialized police violence, I question whether Black Lives
Matter and other police-critical movements’ discourse and
activism should elevate the conviction of killer cops as the highest
form of racial redress.21
There is a reason some police chiefs, prosecutors, and
conservative politicians have gone on the record to vociferously
condemn officers in high-profile brutality cases. That narrative
affirms that police violence is a product of the rare, intentionally
racist and murderous bad cop and not of the institution of policing
and its entrenched structures. Indeed, the police killing anyone,
especially an unarmed civilian, is statistically rare. 22 But the
regular violence and everyday indignity officers disproportionately
exact on minorities—and plenty of marginalized white people—
are not. Interest-convergence theory and history predict that
reformers will find it far easier to succeed with an agenda of
empowering prosecutors to convict a few murderous cops than
with one of dismantling policing as we know it.23
18. See infra Section II.A.; Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 129, 135 (2014) [hereinafter Murder, Minority Victims, & Mercy] (describing
how an “institutional” view of the American death penalty and substantive homicide law
as institutions of racial domination cuts against efforts to equalize them from within).
19. See infra Section III.B; Barbara E. Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability
the Enemy of Prevention?, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 907, 960–61 (2019); Seth Stoughton, Law
Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 225–28 (2015).
20. ‘It’s Called Choking’: Donald Trump Blames Racist Policing on ‘Bad Apples,’
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2020/sep/
02/its-called-choking-donald-trump-blames-racist-policing-on-bad-apples-video [https://per
ma.cc/PJ8H-MXER].
21. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1438 (2016) (“In Ferguson . . . people allied
with the Movement for Black Lives were among the strongest voices for prosecution of
Officer Wilson . . . .”).
22. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL 158 (2017).
23. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.
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I begin this Commentary by disputing a narrative so
entrenched in the American mindset it is rarely questioned—that
the purpose of policing is to fight crime. I then proceed to examine
what the institution of policing has actually proven it is wildly
effective at achieving. It has succeeded spectacularly at what I call
“bluelining,” that is, maintaining raced and classed spatial and
social segregation through the threat and application of violence.
As such, racialized brutality is foundational to the structure of
organized policing and it is manifested programmatically in
everything from recruiting to training and best practices. Finally,
I will conclude by cautioning that, given the institutional and
structural nature of racialized police violence and the inherent
limitations and internal pathologies of criminal prosecution, the
cop-prosecution program holds little promise of creating a more
just system.
II. THE “PURPOSE” OF POLICING
Policing is in a perpetual state of repair. Every day there is a
new proposal for how police departments can finally provide safety
and services without terrorizing marginalized communities and
playing judge, jury, and executioner to those suspected of crimes.
From body cameras to debiasing and deescalation training, there
are a plethora of progressive law and policy reforms intended to
control certain officers’ racist and violent tendencies so that police
can better “do their jobs.”24 What has been strikingly absent from
the mainstream policing literature is the contention that police
officers who engage in racialized violence are doing their jobs.
The conventional narrative, even among reformers, has long
been that the police primarily exist to vindicate the community’s
interest in solving, reducing, and preventing crime.25 In this view,
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49 (2004)
(discussing interest convergence).
24. See Daniel M. Blumberg et al., New Directions in Police Academy Training: A Call
to Action, INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 7 (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.mdpi.com/16604601/16/24/4941/pdf [https://perma.cc/6KXD-NKNZ]; Brett Chapman, Body-Worn
Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/t
opics/articles/body-worn-cameras-what-evidence-tells-us [https://perma.cc/FBH3-B6XV].
See generally Brittain McClurg, Comment, Reducing the Impact of Racial Discrimination
in Policing, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL., no.1, at 201, 216 (2019).
25. See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 31 (2018) (“The police exist to keep us
safe, or so we are told by mainstream media and popular culture.”).
Traditional writing regarding the police function does not view the police as an
instrument of the state conceived to protect the interests of the few at the expense
of the many. On the contrary, police in both England and the United States are
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all the other social arrangements policing has created and
maintained are the fortuitous, unintended, and unimportant
consequences of the police fulfilling their democratic crime-control
function within an as yet unequal society. This presumption is
reflected in the simplistic and misleading claim that urban
communities of color are inundated with street policing because
they have more crime, which law enforcement officers are sworn
to fight.26
However, it is evident that the designation of what is and is
not crime; which crimes within overbroad penal codes are enforced
or tolerated; and who, when, and where enforcement takes place
are not the products of democratic community input. Political
priorities and police practices, from the Black Codes of old to the
stop-and-frisk practices of today, make clear that crimes and
criminal enforcement have never stemmed from a neutral
overlapping consensus about community need. Nevertheless, as
anthropologists Cyril Robinson and Richard Scaglion observe,
“The idea that the police really issue from the community and are
a part of that community has been a pervasive and essential prop
to concepts of modern policing.”27 It is time to lose the prop.
A. Policing Did Not Originate to Fight Crime
The notion that policing is about interdicting crime—or, more
specifically, the conduct everyone agrees is criminal (i.e.,
burglary)—has been remarkably long-lived and intractable,
despite the dearth of evidence that American policing was ever
mainly about crime control. Historians are in fair agreement that
organized police forces began to emerge in the early nineteenth
century and became the norm by the Progressive Era.28 Just as all
generally seen as protectors of the law and order that allow democratic
institutions to operate.
Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, The Origin and Evolution of the Police Function in
Society: Notes Toward a Theory, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109, 114 (1987).
26. See infra Section III.A; RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT
SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 5 (2010) (“[A]
critical and nearly unbridgeable racial-spatial divide in social contexts pervades the United
States and sets the stage for ethno-racial inequality in crime.”).
27. Robinson & Scaglion, supra note 25, at 114.
28. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 29 (8th ed. 2013) (noting that after the creation of the first modern police
force in the 1830s, “Americans moved very slowly in creating new police forces”); Gary
Potter, The History of Policing in the United States, Part 1, E. KY. UNIV. ONLINE: POLICE
STUD. (June 25, 2013), https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-statespart-1 [https://perma.cc/V83F-XAT5] (tracing the earliest police departments to the 1830s
and finding that most major cities had police departments by the 1880s).
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politics is local, the history of policing in the United States is
heterodox, reflecting the social, racial, and economic conditions of
the particular places where and the particular times when the
forces formed. There are even competing historical accounts of
what drove the federal government to organize a national police
force, from the need to control interstate vice to the need to patrol
the interstate.29
The development of state and local police forces is also not a
uniform story, but rather hundreds of local stories, each with their
own lesson. Nevertheless, there is a strikingly consistent feature
of policing origin stories—they have little to do with crime. For
example, throughout the South, the creation of organized police
forces was a crucial part of states’ and society’s project of
maintaining post-war White social and economic supremacy. After
the Civil War, legislation in the form of “Black Codes” replaced
enslavement as the legal construct that maintained Blacks in a
subjugated status.30 The Codes, with their broad and vague
definitions of vagrancy, made emancipated people perpetually
criminal, subject at any time to state control, detention, and
management. Legal scholar Gary Stewart describes the structure
of Mississippi’s Black Codes:
As the first state to pass and implement its set of Black
Codes, Mississippi enacted legislation designed to keep black
people in their rightful place—that is, on the plantation. One
of the most controversial sections of Mississippi’s Black Code
defined “vagrant[s]” as “runaways, drunkards, pilferers;
lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior;
those who neglect their employment, misspend their
earnings, and fail to support their families; and ‘all other idle
and disorderly persons.’” The statute also regulated white
behavior that threatened the existing social order. Thus, a
second group of vagrants included idle blacks and “white

29. Compare JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE
MAKING OF THE FBI 134–35 (2014) (controlling interstate vice), with SARAH A. SEO,
POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 52–53 (2019)
(patrolling the interstate).
30. See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial
Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2257–59 (1998); Sandra
Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary
Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST., Spring 2001, at 156, 160; William Cohen, Negro Involuntary
Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 33–34, 51
(1976); Hubert Williams & Patrick V. Murphy, The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority
View, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING, at 1, 6 (Nat’l Inst. for Just., No. 13, Jan. 1990). See
generally SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE
CAROLINAS 198–200 (2001).
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persons associating with them ‘on terms of equality’ or guilty
of sexual relations with them.” The Act also authorized local
officials to impose a special poll tax on blacks aged eighteen
to sixty, the proceeds of which would be collected for a
“Freedman’s Pauper Fund.” Failure to pay this tax
constituted “prima facie evidence of vagrancy.”31

These vagrancy laws were facially neutral—indeed, some
lawmakers characterized them as intended to protect the
emancipated—but when enforced by the newly formed Southern
police, they were indistinguishable from the prewar slave patrol
regime. 32 Historian Sally Hadden observes that after the Civil
War, “policemen in Southern towns continued to carry out those
aspects of urban slave patrolling that seemed race-neutral but
that in reality were applied selectively. Police saw that nightly
curfews and vagrancy laws kept blacks off city streets, just as
patrollers had done in the colonial and antebellum eras.”33
Like slavery itself, the postslavery legal and law enforcement
regime served the ends of both White racial supremacy and
exploitative agrarian capitalism. Historian Larry Spruill recounts
an 1865 column from the editor of the Lynchburg Virginian stating
that “stringent police regulations may be necessary to keep
[freedmen] from overburdening the towns and depleting the
agricultural regions of labor.” 34 States required an organized
enforcement apparatus to ensure that these newly developed and
broadened vagrancy laws would fulfill their goal of recapturing
Black physical labor and imposition of enslavement by another
name. States organized police forces, which often simply
reconstituted preexisting slave-patrol and slave-hunter groups.
These early police departments enforced the Black Codes
selectively at the behest of plantation owners. This selective—and
brutal—policing was critical to maintaining the racial capitalist

31. Stewart, supra note 30, at 2260–61 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
32. William Cohen remarks:
Broadly drawn vagrancy statutes enabled police to round up idle blacks in times
of labor scarcity and also gave employers a coercive tool that might be used to
keep workers on the job. Those jailed on charges of vagrancy or any other petty
crime were then vulnerable to the operations of the criminal-surety system,
which gave the offender an “opportunity” to sign a voluntary labor contract with
his former employer or some other white who agreed to post bond.
Cohen, supra note 30, at 33–34.
33. HADDEN, supra note 30, at 219.
34. Larry H. Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing Black
Communities, 53 PHYLON, Summer 2016, at 42, 59.
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order built on the backs of enslaved Black people. Historian
William Cohen describes the operation in detail:
At harvest time cotton farms experienced an acute need for
a large work force, and it was precisely at such times that
the police became most active in discovering vagrants. In
September 1901 a number of Mississippi towns rounded up
“idlers and vagrants” and drove them “into the cotton fields
where the farmers are crying for labor to pick the season’s
crop.” . . . So common were such practices that the Atlanta
Constitution could quip to the police: “Cotton is ripening. See
that the ‘vags’ get busy.” Local officials at all levels endorsed
such tactics, and in 1910 a Memphis police-court judge
announced a new policy whereby blacks brought before him
on vagrancy charges would be allowed “to go free provided
they would accept jobs offered by farmers who have set up a
cry over scarcity of ‘hands’.” Warmly endorsed by the mayor
and police commissioner, this plan was accompanied by the
announcement that the police would “renew their efforts to
clear the city of all vagrants and loiterers.”35
In the North, societies and economies were not reliant on the
unique institution of agrarian capitalism enabled by race-based
enslavement. Nevertheless, organized policing’s origin story in
Northern industrial communities runs parallel to the Southern
Reconstruction story. Late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury Northern urban areas were characterized by rapid
industrialization and large influxes of European immigrant
groups. Just as Southern police forces maintained racial and
economic inequality, Northern police forces coalesced to protect
the interests of wealthy manufacturing barons and maintain
White-American dominance over workers, often recent
immigrants considered to be ethnic inferiors.36
The organization of policing in Buffalo, New York, at the turn
of the century is described in detail by sociologists Sidney Harring
and Lorraine McMullin in their 1975 article The Buffalo Police

35. See Cohen, supra note 30, at 34, 41–42, 47–50, 52.
36. See Matthew DeMichele, Policing Protest Events: The Great Strike of 1877 and
WTO Protests of 1999, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5–6 (2008) (“The U.S. police institution, for
the most part, emerged out of the 19th century Industrial Revolution as a politically
dependent organization.”); FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND
POLICE REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA 11–21 (1990) (recounting a similar dynamic in latenineteenth-century Chicago). See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY:
THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN CITIES, 1865–1915, at 32–34, 46 (Haymarket Books 2d ed.
2017) (1983).
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1872–1900.37 After the Civil War, Buffalo experienced rapid
economic growth due to industrialization and population growth
due to a wave of Polish migrants. The Polish immigrants made up
the majority of unskilled workers, and they “were crowded into a
small section of the East Side and scattered in other undesirable
living areas along the waterfront, around factories and near
stockyards where they lived with little income in generally
deplorable conditions.”38 During this time—from the first statute
organizing an official police force in 1871 to 1900—the Buffalo
Police Department also grew precipitously.39 But, “[t]he growth of
the Buffalo force had no direct relationship to either the growth of
the population or to an increase in crime.”40 The question becomes:
What accounted for the creation and proliferation of organized
policing in Buffalo?
Organized policing in Buffalo came into existence for a very
specific purpose: to serve “the wealthiest business interests in
Buffalo [who] exercised direct control over the police
department.” 41 These business magnates regularly occupied the
police infrastructure’s upper echelons, including mayor, police
commissioner, and many of the superintendents. Harring and
McMullin observe, “During the period under consideration
virtually every major business interest in Buffalo was represented
among the Police Commissioners at one time or another. . . . All
major and many extremely minor decisions affecting the police
were made by the two commissioners.”42
The police, however, did not just exercise control
idiosyncratically in response to the business interests of the day.
Their overarching role in Buffalo was clear and programmatic:
they existed to quash “disorder,” namely, the disorder of
immigrant laborers agitating for workers’ rights. Harring and
McMullin explain:
In Buffalo (1872-1900) this “disorder” was based almost
entirely on disputes between business owners and workers
over wages and working conditions. Behind these disputes
are political questions dealing with fundamental
37. Sidney L. Harring & Lorraine M. McMullin, The Buffalo Police 1872–1900: Labor
Unrest, Political Power and the Creation of the Police Institution, CRIME & SOC. JUST., Fall–
Winter 1975, at 5, 7–8.
38. Id. at 5–6.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 10–11.
42. Id. at 8.
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relationships of power and wealth, ownership and control.
The problem of controlling the large dissatisfied working
class became the major impetus to the development of the
Buffalo police force during the years Buffalo was developing
its industry.43

The “disorder” to which the Buffalo police responded with
particular viciousness was primarily not violent strikes. Rather:
The normal procedure was a large police reaction at the first
“reports” of possible strike. It was not unusual for the entire
force to be ordered on duty at the moment the strike was
declared and to remain on duty continuously until the strike
ended—even if it was over a month and no violence
occurred.44
Buffalo police used violence and the threat of violence to break
strikes, break up workers’ meetings, and prevent working-class
people from political assembly by “blocking entrances [to halls],
and by arresting street-corner speakers.” Like Southern police’s
enforcement of Black Codes, Northern police used “[o]ffenses such
as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, tramp, drunkenness . . . to
control any group of working class people.”45
Consequently, the historical antecedents of specific police
departments may be heterodox and dependent on geographic and
temporal conditions, but one thing is abundantly clear: the early
development and proliferation of organized police forces was never
about ordinary crime. It was always about the social, political, and
economic priorities of an empowered group. Whether policing’s
purpose was to impose de facto slavery on emancipated Blacks in
the South, control immigrant laborers in the North, exclude Asian
immigrants in the West, or enforce moral purity regimes
nationally, it was decidedly not about responding to increases in
garden-variety thefts, murders, burglaries, and the like.46 In fact,
in the South, police forces were clear that the epidemic of murders
of Black people was simply not a police issue.47 This history sounds
in the present, according to criminologists Hubert Williams and
Patrick Murphy:

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
See supra notes 28–30, 36–45 and accompanying text; AYA GRUBER, THE
FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME 28–32 (2020) (discussing prostitution policing and immigration
on the West Coast in the latter 1800s).
47. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1117–18, 1153–54 n.231.
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The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but
sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for most
of our Nation’s history—and the fact that the police were
bound to uphold that order—set a pattern for police behavior
and attitudes toward minority communities that has
persisted until the present day. That pattern includes the
idea that minorities have fewer civil rights, that the task of
the police is to keep them under control, and that the police
have little responsibility for protecting them from crime
within their communities.48

Today, policing scholars like Tracey Meares acknowledge “the
racialized origins of policing in America—from its roots in
nineteenth-century slave patrols to its build-up during the early
twentieth century as an immigrant-control brigade.”49
B. Policing Did Not Proliferate to Fight Crime
As much as the creation of police departments had nothing to
do with crime, their expansions were rarely direct reactions to
crime spikes. The early Buffalo Police Department, for example,
grew at a rate that outpaced population growth during a time of
declining crime rates.50 That police department growth, as noted
above, was overtly political, racial, and economic, reflecting
industrialists’ desire to control the immigrant labor force and
quash their burgeoning socialist ideals. There is a similar
contemporary story in which state and local law enforcement’s
precipitous growth in the past several decades had more to do with
political fortunes than spiking crime rates.
“Nationwide data on municipal expenditures and crime rates
from 1990 to 2017” reveals that cities’ crime rates “precipitously
declined, while [their] expenditures on policing significantly
increased.”51 To be more specific, in 1990 there were on average
“12 violent crimes per 1,000 people, and cities spent an average of
$182 (in today’s dollars) per resident on the police.”52

48. Williams & Murphy, supra note 30, at 2.
49. Tracey L. Meares, Policing: A Public Good Gone Bad, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2017), ht
tp://bostonreview.net/law-justice/tracey-l-meares-policing-public-good-gone-bad [https://pe
rma.cc/4R26-Q64L].
50. Harring & McMullin, supra note 37, at 13.
51. Brenden Beck & Aya Gruber, Facts About Defunding Police Departments, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (June 15, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-facts
-about-defunding-police-departments-20200615-fvqkukbngbb2bko3tev5fq52oe-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9NKB-PKLV].
52. Id.
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Compare this to 2017, . . . [in which] [t]he violent crime rate
had decreased by 56% to five crimes per 1,000, but
the . . . police budget had increased by 59%, to $292 per
resident. Across the 1,088 largest municipalities in the U.S.,
that change amounted to an aggregate police budget increase
of over $17 billion per year. [In the same period], cities’
average allocation of funds to health care and public
assistance increased by a modest 5–10%. Spending on
housing and community development did not increase at
all.53

As was the case with turn-of-the-century Buffalo, the increases in
city police budgets from the 1990s to today reflect larger political,
racial, and economic hierarchies. Many thoughtful scholars have
offered insights into the influence of late twentieth-century
American political and economic ideology on law enforcement
policies. Each of those writings merits its own essay.54 But for the
purposes of this Commentary, I offer a nutshell version of this
socio-legal history. In 1968, Richard Nixon, who was campaigning
for president, embraced a strategy of centering law enforcement in
his political platform. At that time, 81% of Harris poll respondents
agreed that “Law and Order has broken down in this country,” a
majority of whom blamed “Negroes” and “Communists.”55 Nixon
capitalized on social anxieties about scruffy hippies and hostile
Blacks fomenting civil unrest and ran a campaign ad pledging to
protect law-abiding citizens from such “domestic violence.”56 He
reportedly later remarked of the ad, “It’s all about those damn
Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.” 57 Nixon deftly employed
the so-called “Southern Strategy,” developed during the 1964
Barry Goldwater presidential campaign, which used dog-whistle
racist crime rhetoric to court Dixiecrats to the Republican Party.58

53. Id.; see also Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 761
(2020) (“In economically depressed cities where virtually all other services are defunded,
police departments are often one of few entities that remain, usually in weakened form.”).
54. E.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 157, 164 (2007); DAVID
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 91–93 (2001); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR
64–67 (George Steinmetz & Julia Adams eds., Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004); MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS 20, 31 (2006).
55. Dennis D. Loo & Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics, and Crime: The “Law and
Order” Issue of the 1960s, 5 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50, 59–60 (2004).
56. Scott Laderman, How Richard Nixon Captured White Rage—and Laid the
Groundwork for Donald Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingt
onpost.com/outlook/2019/11/03/how-richard-nixon-captured-white-rage-laid-groundwork-d
onald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/GSG6-E54J].
57. Id.
58. ANGIE MAXWELL & TODD SHIELDS, THE LONG SOUTHERN STRATEGY 37 (2019).
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President Ronald Reagan picked up on this strategy in the
’80s and notably also used the crime issue to sell his radical
deregulatory and anti-welfare economic program, often
shorthanded by scholars as “neoliberalism.” Reagan vowed to—
and did—gut government aid programs, deregulate banks and the
market, cut taxes, and end labor and trade protections.59 As
President Obama remarked in 2008, “Ronald Reagan changed the
trajectory of America . . . .”60 Since the “Reagan Revolution,” the
wealth gap has widened into a chasm.61 According to economists,
between 1980 and 2014, “eight points of national income
transferred from the bottom 50% to the top 1%. The top 1% income
share is now [in 2014] almost twice as large as the bottom 50%
share, a group that is by definition 50 times more numerous.”62
This reverse-Robin Hood program has endured. On October 30,
2020, Bloomberg News reported that during President Trump’s
term, billionaires’ accumulated wealth increased by thirty percent,
amounting to an “increase[] [in] their combined wealth by a
staggering $1 trillion.”63
Reagan and his allies’ ideology was tailor-made for the one
percent, but they were able to sell it to the other ninety-nine by
portraying the poor as responsible for their plights and recasting
the problems of poverty as products of criminality. Reagan drew a

59. See MICHAEL MEEROPOL, SURRENDER: HOW THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
COMPLETED THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 3, 84–85 (2000); MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES:
BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND THE NEW SOCIAL CONSERVATISM 18, 22 (2017); Spencer
Rich, Reagan Welfare Cuts Found to Worsen Families’ Poverty, WASH. POST (July 29, 1984),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/07/29/reagan-welfare-cuts-foundto-worsen-families-poverty/077278f9-a875-4791-9c34-d1cf3cd148b5/ [https://perma.cc/8YR
C-MPL8]; STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 106TH CONG., PRESIDENT REAGAN’S ECONOMIC
LEGACY: THE GREAT EXPANSION 26–29 (2000), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/file
s/62cfde42-3fbc-4b6e-b308-c78dd32515e6/president-reagan-s-economic-legacy-great-expan
sion-oct-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL96-TA7B] (primarily authored by Senator Connie
Mack).
60. In Their Own Words: Obama on Reagan, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS, https://archive
.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/us/politics/21seelye-text.html?module=inline [https://p
erma.cc/4LJ6-GTED] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019); Robert Farley, Obama Not a Reagan
Democrat, POLITIFACT (Jan. 21, 2008), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2008/jan/21/bi
llclinton/obama-not-a-reagan-democrat/ [https://perma.cc/C5V2-U4WH].
61. Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United
States, PATHWAYS, Winter 2008, at 6, 7, 7 fig.1, https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/winter_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN27-KZQD].
62. Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates
for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 557 (2018).
63. Ben Steverman, U.S. Billionaires Got $1 Trillion Richer During Trump’s Term,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-3
0/u-s-billionaires-got-1-trillion-richer-in-trump-s-first-term?utm_source=url_link [https://p
erma.cc/T3HF-YY82].
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straight line from liberals’ social welfare ideology to the pressing
crime problem:
Individual wrongdoing, they told us, was always caused by a
lack of material goods, and underprivileged background, or
poor socioeconomic conditions. And somehow . . . it was
society, not the individual, that was at fault when an act of
violence or a crime was committed. Somehow, it wasn’t the
wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is it any wonder,
then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class
of repeat offenders and career criminals who thought they
had the right to victimize their fellow citizens with
impunity[?]64
The rhetorical move is brilliant in its simplicity. It reverses the
moral order, transforming the “underprivileged” into a “privileged
class,” transforming society’s victims into “victimizers.” Following
the Southern Strategy, Reagan utilized racialized crime
narratives to displace the image of the deserving poor with the
image of the poor Black criminal.65 This narrative set the stage for
a total transformation of government intervention, replacing the
safety net with a metal cage.
With pro-prison, pro-policing politics so firmly entrenched in
the American psyche, in the late twentieth century politicians on
both sides of the aisle competed for the mantle of tough-on-crime
by proposing to expand police departments and prison capacity.
During the 1988 presidential race, George H.W. Bush ran the
infamous race-baiting Willie Horton ad,66 hammering Michael
Dukakis for furloughing (temporarily releasing) the convicted
felon, who then raped a White woman. The ad featured a mugshot
of Horton—a “very scary looking, disheveled, wild-eyed black
man,” one expert observed—with the message, “Weekend prison
passes—Dukakis on crime.”67 In the wake of Dukakis’s electoral
decimation, Democratic Senators Joe Biden and Chuck Schumer
64. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National
Sheriff’s Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), in RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-a
nnual-conference-national-sheriffs-association-hartford-connecticut [https://perma.cc/FNG
2-4KNW] (last visited Mar. 31. 2021).
65. See Dylan Tureff, Securing White Votes by Incarcerating Black Bodies, GEO. PUB.
POL’Y REV. (2020), http://www.gpprspring.com/securing-white-votes-by-incarcerating-black
-bodies-tureff [https://perma.cc/QF67-FUQ8].
66. Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 537–
38 (1996).
67. T.J. Raphael, How One Political Ad Held Back a Generation of American Inmates,
WORLD (May 18, 2015, 2:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-05-18/what-willie-horton
-wrought [https://perma.cc/GAA4-R9TW].
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feared the “Hortonizing” of the entire Democratic Party. 68 They
masterminded the “Biden-Schumer strategy,” as an insider called
it,69 to court moderate voters by making Democrats the party of
law enforcement in an era of racialized hysteria over crack. Biden
had previously authored the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
established the infamous 100:1 crack-powder cocaine sentencing
disparity.70
Biden introduced the initial version of the now-infamous
“1994 Crime Bill” in 1991 and boasted that Republicans would no
longer be able to “demagogue crime.”71 “By 1992, polls showed that
the public had gone from viewing Democrats as relatively weak on
crime to [seeing] the parties as virtually even.”72 Bill Clinton made
the Crime Bill a priority of his campaign and a signature
achievement of his first term. Signing the law, Clinton reminded
folks that it was necessary because “[g]angs and drugs have taken
over our streets and undermined our schools.”73 Biden touted the
new law’s ability to change the face of the Democratic party: “The
liberal wing of the Democratic Party is now for 60 new death
penalties. . . . The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for
100,000 cops. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for
125,000 new State prison cells.”74
Similar dynamics of carceral politics and ideology played out
in states and localities. Public fears about leftist ideologies,
integration, and urban Black spaces made crime control a political

68. Chernoff et al., supra note 66, at 538.
69. Id. at 538–40.
70. See Federal Cocaine Sentencing Laws: Reforming the 100:1 Crack Powder
Disparity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/biden_statement_02_12_08
.pdf [https://perma.cc/J864-MP35].
71. Guy Gugliotta, Crime Bill a Hostage of Politics, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 1992), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/08/05/crime-bill-a-hostage-of-politics/e3ec
bbdb-8259-4cc7-a407-deee5038bbd0/ [https://perma.cc/8UMS-592G]; German Lopez, The
Controversial 1994 Crime Law that Joe Biden Helped Write, Explained, VOX (Sept. 29, 2020,
10:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/20/18677998/joe-biden-1994-cri
me-bill-law-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/84TU-ZS6W].
72. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 147; see Jill Lawrence, Both Sides Talking Tough on
Crime, Looking for Law-and-Order Votes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 13, 1992, LEXIS; David
Peterson, Differences on Crime Barely Register; Bush, GOP Avoid Pulling a ‘Willie Horton’
on Clinton, STAR TRIB., Oct. 30, 1992, at 5VS, LEXIS.
73. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Sept. 13, 1994), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1539–40 (1995).
74. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 140 CONG. REC. S12,421
(1994) (Conf. Rep.) (LEXIS) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden).
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ace to politicians of all stripes.75 The salience of crime grew in force
throughout the ’80s and ’90s, aided by opportunistic politicians
and the burgeoning twenty-four-hour-news industry. 76 Today,
there is a wealth of historical and sociological literature describing
the rise of the late twentieth-century penal state and the scholarly
consensus that crime-control trends were driven by “pathological
politics.” 77 Still, many commentators mechanically repeat the
conventional narrative that policing and prosecution expanded
and became harsher in the 1980s and 1990s in reaction to a
precipitous spike in crime. 78 Although there is some empirical
support for increased crime during that time, such was not the
main driver of the penological changes.79
The crime fears that hastened Nixon’s victory did not relate
to a rash of robberies and assaults but to fears over rioting hippies
and undifferentiated minority “Negro-Puerto Rican[s].”80 And to
the extent that people did fear “crime” in the ’80s and ’90s,
conservative and liberal political rhetoric had already established
the “crime problem” as an urban Black problem. 81 Whether by
“[l]iberal racial pity” or “conservative racial contempt,” as political
scientist Naomi Murakawa put it, crime was synonymized with
Black “pathology,” making it impossible to neatly sever crime fears
from the older racial segregationist programs that drove initial
policing investments.82 Images of “blighted” Black neighborhoods
have regularly made media rounds for decades. To this day,
Americans, when polled, consistently express that crime is
75. Loo & Grimes, supra note 55, at 60; see also infra text accompanying note 131
(discussing salience of “the ghetto”).
76. See Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims’ Rights
Movement, 43 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 669, 680 (1999); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s
Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 419–23 (2006).
77. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 526 (2001); RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION 169 (2019).
78. Scott Boggess & John Bound, Did Criminal Activity Increase During the 1980s?
Comparisons Across Data Sources, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 725, 732, 737 (1997) (noting that there
is a “widely held belief that there was a significant increase in the level of [serious] criminal
activity during the 1980s,” particularly among the urban underclass).
79. See Stuntz, supra note 77, at 524–57.
80. See Laderman, supra note 56.
81. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 15.
82. Id.; ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 75–79 (2016); see also, e.g., id. at 57–61
(discussing the infamous “Moynihan Report” that argued crime is linked to Black
“pathology”); OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN. & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 38–44 (1965).
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perpetually increasing, a “pressing problem,” and “out of
control.”83
Still, most people—including progressive scholars—simply
accept the widely touted contention that tough-on-crime
governance in the ’80s and ’90s was a clear response to out-ofcontrol crime plaguing the entire nation.84 However, the empirical
evidence does not show that the crime-control agenda was a
reactionary phenomenon based on clear law enforcement need.
When Clinton signed the 1994 Crime Bill, crime rates were
already in decline. 85 Analyzing data on police employment and
crime rates from 1991 to 2000, researchers William McCarty, Ling
Ren, and Solomon Zhao concluded that “increases in police
strength during the 1990s [had] little to do with changes in all
measures of the crime rate after controlling for other demographic
factors.”86
In the 1980s, there was an uptick in select violent crimes in
urban areas related to the crack cocaine trade.87 The media and
politicians focused relentlessly on the “crack epidemic,” stirring up
fears of “Black crime.”88 The images of crack-driven Black
criminality played into the politics that drove policing’s expansion
everywhere, despite the fact that crack-associated crime did not
affect the vast majority of American communities. 89 Examining
crime data between 1979 and 1992, demographers Scott Boggess
and John Bound conclude that “[t]he statistics do not support the
notion that there [was] any overall rise in the level of criminal
activity.”90
83. See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of
Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 724–25
(2001); Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
419, 425 (1999); Maggie Koerth & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Many Americans Are
Convinced Crime Is Rising in the U.S. They’re Wrong., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 3, 2020,
6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/many-americans-are-convinced-crime-is-risi
ng-in-the-u-s-theyre-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/LQG7-SNPF].
84. See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
BLACK AMERICA 156 (2017).
85. OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME
DECLINE? 15–16, 16 fig.2 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/
Report_What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.pdf [https://perma.cc/87ZF-KQVQ] (observing
that crimes peaked in 1991).
86. William P. McCarty et al., Determinants of Police Strength in Large U.S. Cities
During the 1990s: A Fixed-Effects Panel Analysis, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 397, 414 (2012).
87. Boggess & Bound, supra note 78, at 725, 736–37.
88. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 121–25.
89. See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror:
Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182, 184–88 (2004).
90. Boggess & Bound, supra note 78, at 726 (emphasis added).
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C. Policing Does Not Fight Crime
Finally, the police-as-crime-fighter narrative fares poorly
from an empirical efficacy standpoint. Today, there are decades
worth of criminological research and hundreds of thousands of
pages written on whether police activity actually reduces and
prevents crime. Much of this scholarship comes from economists
who generally view crime and enforcement in purely financial
terms and concentrate on the question of whether a dollar spent
on policing prevents a dollar worth of crime in some fixed point in
time.91 Now, some scholars critique the purely economic approach
as unduly narrow. It tends to omit the financial costs that arrest,
police violence, and criminal prosecution impose on individuals
and communities.92 Moreover, economic analysis does not look at
social costs, happiness indexes, the differential meaning of a dollar
to different people, and the like. Nor does it consider more inchoate
costs, like the healthcare price of the morbid stress suffered by
those who experience racialized police violence or the lost
productivity of communities whose potential young workforce is
trapped in a repeat cycle of arrest, incarceration, and collateral
consequences. In short, the police efficiency calculus virtually
ignores the long-term costs that systematic state violence imposes
on Black Americans.93
Nevertheless, even within such narrow parameters that look
only at the dollar-based efficiency of police at reducing crime,
“[t]here is a consensus [among experts] that the standard model of
policing, which focuses on random preventive patrols and rapid
response time, does not significantly reduce crime or even fear of
crime,” as economists Justin McCrary and Deepak Premkumar
note.94 Researchers have also determined that “proactive policing,”
which includes strict enforcement of “quality-of-life” offenses,
street sweeps, and stop-and-frisks, does not reduce, and in fact
91. See, e.g., Justin McCrary & Deepak Premkumar, Why We Need Police, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 65–66 (Tamara Rice Lave &
Eric J. Miller eds., 2019) (“[W]e discuss how one could estimate how much crime could be
reduced if additional funds were directed to hire more law enforcement officers . . . .”).
92. Charles F. Manski & Daniel S. Nagin, Assessing Benefits, Costs, and Disparate
Racial Impacts of Confrontational Proactive Policing, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9308,
9309–10 (2017), https://www.pnas.org/content/114/35/9308.short [https://perma.cc/4E6Q-7
BGK].
93. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1179 (suggesting that there are other
problems with such empirical research, including that it analyzes “crime” reduction without
interrogating what should and shouldn’t be a crime and often relies on inaccurate police
self-reporting, i.e., bad information goes in, so bad information comes out).
94. McCrary & Premkumar, supra note 91, at 79.
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may increase, crime. 95 Now, regarding hot-spot policing—a
policing where resources are invested in targeted areas—McCrary
and Premkumar conclude that the studies show the technique
tends to reduce crime.96 Still, they acknowledge that such a
reduction may be due to people avoiding the targeted areas or due
to arrestees being temporarily incapacitated.97 And given that
targeted policing entrenches segregation, it may have an overall
criminogenic effect. Researchers, for example, find that “racial
residential segregation is strongly associated with the BlackWhite racial disparity in overall rates of firearm homicide at the
state level.”98
Regardless of the state of contemporary research on the
return on investment of hot-spot policing, the important point is
that after 150 years in which organized policing has been a daily
fact of American life, we still cannot proclaim with any reasonable
certainty that policing actually fights crime.99 Consider, for
example, the 2014 study by criminologists Gary Kleck and J.C.
Barnes, Do More Police Lead to More Crime Deterrence? 100 The
authors noted at the outset that the “[r]esearch concerning the
deterrent effect of police activity on crime is decidedly mixed” and
that “no prior research has directly tested whether police strength
levels actually affect prospective offenders’ perceptions of arrest
risks.”101 So, they set out to measure the deterrent effect of
increased police presence by examining “individual-level
perceptions of arrest likelihood.” 102 The researchers discovered
95. Id. at 75 (“Overall, our reading of this literature is that there is a substantial lack
of evidence in favor of proactive policing having any substantial effect on crime.”); see also
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 285–86, 285 n.53 (2006); Richard
Rosenfeld et al., The Impact of Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and
Robbery Rates: 1988-2001, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 357–58 (2007).
96. McCrary & Premkumar, supra note 91, at 69–71.
97. Id.
98. Michael Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings: An Empirical
Analysis Informed by Critical Race Theory, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1086 (2020) (emphasis
omitted); see also Aldina Mesic et al., The Relationship Between Structural Racism and
Black-White Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings at the State Level, 110 J. NAT’L MED.
ASS’N 106, 113 (2018).
99. See David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing Inevitably Lead to Unfair and
Abusive Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness and Effectiveness in the New
Proactive Policing?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 661, 667 (“Studies of policing in [the 1980s]
provided a very strong narrative regarding the inability of the police to prevent crime.”).
100. Gary Kleck & J.C. Barnes, Do More Police Lead to More Crime Deterrence?, 60
CRIME & DELINQ. 716 (2014).
101. Id. at 720.
102. Id. at 721.
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that “police manpower levels have no effect on perceptions of the
risk of arrest, and thus do not influence the amount of general
deterrent effects on crime.”103 And in typical empirical researcher
style, their conclusion that policing is not efficient was all about
fiscal efficiency:
In light of these findings, policy makers may want to
reconsider whether increases in police manpower bring
sufficient crime reduction benefits to justify their costs.
Conversely, in times of fiscal crisis, it is worth considering
the possibility that cuts in police strength may be
implemented without causing crime increases. Even in times
of fiscal plenty, it may be worth thinking about alternative
investments that are more likely to reduce crime.104
Indeed, policing studies typically assess efficacy and efficiency by
comparing a given policing program to a world without that
program and without alternative crime reduction efforts. The
studies, like the conventional narrative, presume that policing and
not policing are the sole crime interdiction options. This
presumption is despite the fact that organized policing was not
borne of the need to reduce crime, and that its relationship to
crime rates is tenuous at best. And even with this all-or-nothing
focus, the studies still do not demonstrate with clarity that policing
programs are efficacious or efficient. Policing scholar David Bailey
put it bluntly:
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept
secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it,
but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that
they are society’s best defense against crime and continually
argue that if they are given more resources, especially
personnel, they will be able to protect communities against
crime. This is a myth.105

103. Id. at 732. The researchers hypothesized that people’s perceptions that their
neighborhood had high crime rates—a perception that could correlate with more police—
could make people feel like the chances of getting caught were low. Id. at 724. In addition,
they found that having been arrested did not cause an increase in fear of arrest, perhaps
because of the “gamblers fallacy” where people who are arrested once feel less likely to be
arrested again. Id. at 729. The researchers rejected that increased police presence reduced
crime through incapacitation because of the state of prisons as always full all the time. Id.
at 730–31. They thus offered some hypotheses for why other studies had (wrongly)
correlated police presence and crime rates. Id. at 732.
104. Id. at 735–36.
105. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 3 (1994).
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III. THE PURPOSE OF POLICING
Policing has never really been about crime. And yet, wellmeaning scholars and reformers have expended enormous
amounts of intellectual and political capital on trying to “fix” the
institution so that it can finally fulfill its community crimefighting function in a fair manner. This persistent emphasis on
improving police techniques, which legitimizes and strengthens
the policing institution, is largely a legacy of liberal politics and
sensibilities. According to Naomi Murakawa, Democrats during
the 1960s spearheaded the police “professionalization” agenda,
which involved an opaque set of imperatives to make the police
more objective: reliance on data, hierarchical structure, and
resistance to outside political or social influence. 106 Liberal
politicians undertook this project precisely to dislodge “the ‘deepseated belief amongst our Negro citizens that equal law
enforcement in police practices does not exist anywhere in
our land,’” as one Democratic senator remarked. 107 The
professionalization movement intended to, and was largely
successful in, the entrenchment of the police-as-crime-fighter
narrative, with the result that today most people see the bad
effects of policing as failures—unintended and intermittent
breakdowns to be worked on.108
Despite the general scholarly fixation with fixing the police’s
crime-fighting failures, several critical scholars have instead
focused on understanding policing’s success in shaping social,
political, and economic arrangements. Michel Foucault famously
observes in Discipline and Punish, “For the observation that
prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the
hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well . . . in
producing the delinquent as a pathologized subject.”109 He goes on,
“So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half
of ‘failures’, the prison still exists, producing the same results, and
there is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it.”110 Similarly,
106. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 47; see also David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull
of Police Professionalism, NEW PERSPS. POLICING, Mar. 2011, at 1, 6 (“The core ideal of the
professional model—the police as crime control experts, leveraging managerial
sophistication and advanced technology to enforce the law objectively, aggressively and
apolitically—is in some ways more appealing today than it used to be.”).
107. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting Senator Joseph Tydings).
108. See Sklansky, supra note 106, at 11.
109. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 277 (2d
Vintage Books ed. 1995).
110. Id.
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we might see the police as wildly successful at fulfilling their role
of maintaining hierarchy and state control, from defending racial
capitalism to maintaining class dominance and social order in
times of class conflict and scarcity.111 Robinson and Scaglion
contend, “The police institution is created by the emerging
dominant class as an instrument for the preservation of its control
over restricted access to basic resources, over the political
apparatus governing this access, and over the labor force
necessary to provide the surplus upon which the dominant class
lives.”112
In recent years, as Black Lives Matter activists and other
criminal justice reformers spotlighted the perils of policing, an
increasing number of scholarly commentators pushed back on the
notion that racist police brutality is simply crime-fighting run
amok.113 Author Alex Vitale wrote in 2017, “The reality is that the
police exist primarily as a system for managing and even
producing inequality by suppressing social movements and tightly
managing the behaviors of poor and nonwhite people: those on the
losing end of economic and political arrangements.” 114 Law
Professor Paul Butler recently responded to the contention that
the law enforcement machine is simply in need of a tune-up with
this blunt assessment: “Don’t get it twisted – the criminal justice
system ain’t broke. It’s working just the way it’s supposed to.”115
Those horrified by the recent spate of high-profile police brutality
cases could gain invaluable insights by analyzing racist violence
not from the point of view of failure but of success.
A. Bluelining as Police Success
From its very inception, the institution of American policing
has succeeded extremely well at controlling race, space, and
place.116 Police, in tandem with organized private neighborhood
watches, have served as the border patrols of middle-class
neighborhoods, reflecting and reinforcing the mythology of the
111. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35 (discussing the role of policing and
racial capitalism); AHMED WHITE, THE LAST GREAT STRIKE: LITTLE STEEL, THE CIO, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR RIGHTS IN NEW DEAL AMERICA 130–37 (2016) (describing the
Chicago Police Department’s violent response to the Little Steel Strike in May 1937);
WACQUANT, supra note 54, at 4–5.
112. Robinson & Scaglion, supra note 25, at 114 (citation omitted).
113. See, e.g., VITALE, supra note 25, at 34.
114. Id.
115. Paul Butler (@LawProfButler), TWITTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://twitter.co
m/lawprofbutler/status/949095933224120322 [https://perma.cc/6TWS-C3E3].
116. See Bass, supra note 30, at 159.

58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021)

892

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[58:4

suburbs being “invaded” by minorities. 117 Critical race theorist
Keith Aoki explains the role of geography in maintaining
hierarchy, “Space defines political boundaries as well as private
property—constructing, ratifying and reproducing community and
individual identities as well as pre-existing distributive
inequities—and then, importantly, making those outcomes seem
‘natural.’ Wall Street thrives and South Central Los Angeles
seethes—that’s just the way things are.”118
Indeed, President Trump emphasized the need to protect the
suburbs from minorities, tweeting in August 2020, “The ‘suburban
housewife’ will be voting for me[] [because] [t]hey want safety
[and] are thrilled that I ended the long running program where
low income housing would invade their neighborhood.”119 His
entreaties late in the presidential campaign for “suburban women”
to “please like me” because he “saved your damn neighborhood”
were relentless and depressingly comical. 120 Trump’s rhetoric
follows what philosopher Olúfémi Táíwò calls the “basic socialstructural characteristics of those who spread the capitalist
economic system: a tendency to organise populations into clusters,
to separate those clusters into vertical hierarchies, and to
legitimate this stratification via racialist thought and practice.”121
Dean Onwuachi-Willig has focused on George Zimmerman’s
murder acquittal as an exemplar of state and social toleration for
the violent maintenance of spatial and social segregation.122 The
killing of innocent teen Trayvon Martin was the culmination of
Zimmerman’s years-long quest to stave off spatial diversification
by privately patrolling his neighborhood and regularly calling the
police to prevent its penetration by Black “outsiders.”123 In Policing
the Boundaries of Whiteness, Onwuachi-Willig illustrates through
117. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1174.
118. Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third World” in
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913, 923 (2000).
119. Reuters Staff, Trump: ‘Suburban’ Americans Don’t Want Low-Income Housing
Foisted on Them, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election
-trump-suberbs/trump-suburban-americans-dont-want-low-income-housing-foisted-on-the
m-idUSKCN25E1X4 [https://perma.cc/H8R3-FWK5].
120. Shane Goldmacher, Trump Again Tramples on His Own Message, as Biden Courts
Older Voters in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/us
/elections/trump-again-tramples-on-his-own-message-as-biden-courts-older-voters-in-flori
da.html [https://perma.cc/2FMZ-7LFL].
121. Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Who Gets to Feel Secure?, AEON (Oct. 30, 2020), https://aeon.co/
essays/on-liberty-security-and-our-system-of-racial-capitalism [https://perma.cc/6T5S-J7H
4].
122. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1156–57.
123. Id. at 1172–74.
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a deep historical examination of Zimmerman’s Sanford, Florida,
neighborhood that geography and racial hierarchy are inextricably
linked.124 She writes:
[R]esidents were working to preserve the whiteness of the
Retreat at Twin Lakes or at least what they perceived as a
“white space.” . . . For some of the residents of the Retreat at
Twin Lakes like Zimmerman and Taaffe, they viewed the
neighborhood as a white space—meaning a space that is
economically more privileged and socially desirable because
it is occupied primarily by Whites—and they saw any Blacks
whom they did not know as intruders. As a consequence, the
narrative they developed for the downturn in their
neighborhood centered around race and the sense that their
“white” neighborhood was being besieged by black males,
despite the fact that only 2 out of 44 incidents were confirmed
to involve Blacks or, more specifically, black males—for a
total of three Blacks. More so, the Retreat’s neighborhood
watch residents, particularly Zimmerman, acted on this
racialized view of the neighborhood by repeatedly making
calls to 911 whenever they encountered persons they did not
know who were black, but not doing the same with Whites
who were unknown to them.125
This neighborhood border patrolling was aided and abetted by the
Sanford police, who likewise adopted a false race-based view of
crime in the neighborhood.126 Onwuachi-Willig explains:
Indeed, the racial meaning of the Retreat at Twin Lakes was
also seemingly adopted by the police officers who arrived on
the scene to investigate the killing of Martin. Viewing Martin
much like Zimmerman did before and after he followed the
boy—as an outsider, not a guest or resident in the
neighborhood—the officers did not knock on any doors in the
neighborhood to see if Martin might be living in or visiting
someone in the gated community. In fact, they left Martin at
the morgue as a “John Doe” overnight until his parents called
the police in a frantic search for their son.127
Police are essential to maintaining White, nonpoor citizens’
dominion not just over middle-class neighborhoods but also over
shared spaces. Officers relentlessly patrol commercial areas and
communal spaces like parks and plazas to ensure that the “wrong”
people stay in their highly demarcated and tightly controlled
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1168–85.
Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
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areas. The police’s geographical domination on behalf of the
privileged comes under the guise of preventing the “disorder” that
is offensive to the “community.”128 The word “community” is
prevalent in public order discourses, implying that the police are
merely passively following some neutral and natural consensus
about who does and does not belong in shared spaces over which,
in theory, no one person or group has a veto. The result, as critical
geographer Marie-Eve Sylvestre observes, is that “public spaces
have been reorganized and reordered in the context of disorder
policing so as to create new barriers and signs of exclusion that
reduce the range of possible sensations, social practices, and
interactions.”129
Police draw blue lines around Black neighborhoods—just as
banks drew their red lines—designating them as high-risk areas
and stigmatizing them as degraded, pathological spaces.130 Police
refer to these hyper-surveilled, tightly controlled, excluded
neighborhoods as “high crime areas.” To be sure, the image of the
high-crime Black “ghetto” has been particularly salient in
American political culture and has played a significant role in
Americans’ support for the massive police control of minority
communities and inalterable belief that crime is always on the
rise. 131 The “high crime neighborhood” language once again
deceptively suggests that the police’s program of spatial
confinement and control over minority neighborhoods is really
about crime interdiction.
However, decades-worth of studies have shown that “high
crime neighborhood” is merely a proxy for poor minority
neighborhood. The designation has more to do with the racial
make-up of the area than the number of crimes committed there.
A 2019 study by researchers Ben Grunwald and Jeffrey Fagan, the
latest in a long-line of research, concludes, “[Officers’] assessments
of high-crime areas are only weakly correlated with actual crime
rates. The suspect’s race predicts whether an officer deems an area
128. See infra text accompanying notes 134–137.
129. Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Disorder and Public Spaces in Montreal: Repression (and
Resistance) Through Law, Politics, and Police Discretion, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 803, 820
(2010).
130. Murakawa and others also trace the narrative of the pathological Black “ghetto”
to liberal politics and policies. See MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 24; HINTON, supra note 82,
at 127.
131. See John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: “Hewing
a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1995) (“[T]he
racial ghetto is a paradigm site of racial projects. It is where we connect what race means
discursively and racially organize both social structures and everyday experience.”).
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high crime . . . .” 132 Moreover, researchers find that “one of the
strongest predictors of police strength” is “the percentage of Black
population” in an area. 133 A study of police deployment in the
1990s confirmed that “[an] increase in 1% of Black population
[was] associated with an increase in 5.54 police officers per
100,000 residents.”134
Police have set forth other rationales for bluelining Black
neighborhoods. The infamous “broken-window theory” postulates
that cleaning up the streets of the appearance of lawlessness by
arresting those who commit minor offenses, such as graffiti artists,
loiterers, and sex workers, efficiently reduces major crimes.135 In
1982, criminologist George Kelling and social scientist James Q.
Wilson wrote an influential popular press article in the Atlantic
magazine, Broken Windows. 136 In it, they argue that arresting
“disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people” like
“panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes,
loiterers, [and] the mentally disturbed” creates a virtuous lawabiding community mentality and deters would-be felons from
committing serious crimes.137 “Broken-window theory” champions
the very vagrancy policing that proved so critical to maintaining
de facto enslavement in the Reconstruction-era South and to
managing the economic casualties of the industrializing North.138
The theory purports to be about the interdiction of serious
crimes, although the social science has shown that quality-ofpolicing does not reduce serious crime and may exacerbate the
structural conditions underlying criminal activity.139 However,
from the beginning, broken-windows policing advocates have not
characterized sweeping up people whose only offense is being
young, poor, or unhoused as an unfortunate cost of preventing
“real” crime.140 Instead, they have emphasized that managing

132. Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 396 (2019). Race also predicts whether nonpolice people see a
neighborhood as “high crime.” See Quillian & Pager, supra note 83, at 719.
133. McCarty et al., supra note 86, at 412.
134. Id. at 410.
135. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive
/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/BV53-R74Q].
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See supra notes 30–31, 45 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
140. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 135.

58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021)

896

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[58:4

these “obstreperous” people is a crucial end in itself. 141 Big-city
police chiefs like William Bratton, New York City Mayor Rudy
Giuliani’s first police commissioner, strongly embraced and
quickly enacted broken-windows policing.142 He explains that he
supported the policing method because of his personal experience
as an officer in Boston, where “prostitution and graffiti” were big
problems in inner cities.143 For him, street sweeping is itself an
exercise in fighting “crimes committed against the community.”144
At the same time, broken-window theory’s emphasis on visible
disorder has given the police a scientifically sanitized justification
for their long-standing program of demarcating poor, urban
neighborhoods for uniquely aggressive street policing.
The bluelining of Black neighborhoods establishes within
cities archipelagos of diminished citizenship, where police use
aggressive stop-and-frisks, intense surveillance, and militarystyle home raids to keep the people in their spatial and social
place. “You cannot truly be free when the police are able to set
upon you at will, for no particular reason at all,” scholar KeeangaYamahtta Taylor laments, “[i]t is a constant reminder of the space
between freedom and ‘unfreedom,’ where the contested citizenship
of African Americans is held.”145 While claiming to be the “thin
blue line” between social order and crime run amok, police were
always the thick blue line between elites and the marginalized.
Recently, New York Congresswoman Alexandria OcasioCortez, a staunch critic of police violence, considered the question
of what “an America with defunded police look[s] like.” She
answered simply, “It looks like a suburb.”146 To be sure, one
residing in a “low crime” suburb is unlikely to recall witnessing a
heavily armed militarized “jump-out squad,” clad in flak jackets
and ski masks, alight a serial-killer-style white van and slam a
bunch of youths against a wall. But many in targeted

141. See id.
142. Bruce Weber, James Q. Wilson Dies at 80; Originated ‘Broken Windows’ Policing
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/nyregion/james-qwilson-dies-at-80-originated-broken-windows-policing-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/UR
Q7-XANM].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION
108 (2016).
146. Hannah Bleau, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: Defund the Police ‘Looks like a Suburb,’
BREITBART (June 12, 2020), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/06/12/alexandria-ocasi
o-cortez-defund-police-looks-suburb/ [https://perma.cc/ZL5N-H8VV].
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neighborhoods would nod with a sad familiarity.147 Angela Harris
observes:
[P]olice brutality is not random. It follows the vectors of
power established in the larger society in which white
dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor. Police often,
and not without justification, understand their charge as the
protection of “nice” neighborhoods and “decent” people
against those perceived to be a threat. In practice, this often
means that male power and state power converge on the
black and Latino “underclass.”148
Courts have consistently upheld the differential treatment of
those in “high crime neighborhoods,” thereby inscribing into the
law racial segregation and inequality. Many are familiar with the
seminal case Terry v. Ohio. That case, decided amid the political
and demographic upheavals of 1968, authorizes police to stop,
question, and search individuals without probable cause. 149 The
Supreme Court declared that to stop and investigate an
individual, police need only reasonable articulable suspicion that
crime may be “afoot.” 150 If they have that level of information,
detention and frisk does not offend the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. 151 The Court’s
creation of such a nebulous and low bar prompted Justice Douglas
to lament, “There have been powerful hydraulic pressures
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper
hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today.”152
Although Terry technically allows the police to engage in “stop
and frisks” anywhere, courts have made clear that police have far
more leeway to detain people in bluelined neighborhoods. In the
2000 case Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court held that a person’s mere
presence in a “high-crime area” constitutes half of the reasonable
articulable suspicion that justified a stop.153 The other half of the
147. See Jason Cherkis, Rough Justice, WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2000), https://washi
ngtoncitypaper.com/article/269885/rough-justice/ [https://perma.cc/YKB7-38PG].
148. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777, 797 (2000); see also Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 149–
50, 163–64 (2017).
149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
150. Id. at 30.
151. Id. at 30–31.
152. Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
153. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–26 (2000).
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equation is flight from police. 154 The Court was unmoved by
Justice Stevens’s dissenting point that “[a]mong some citizens,
particularly minorities and those residing in high crime
areas . . . the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or
without justification, believes that contact with the police can
itself be dangerous.”155 In Justice Stevens’s view, the very fact of a
high-crime neighborhood negates the inference that flight
indicates criminality. 156 Alas, the Court presumed, without
evidence, both that police’s designation of a neighborhood as “high
crime” means that each one of its inhabitants is relatively
suspicious and that flight invariably confirms such suspicion.
Through doctrinal machinations and formalistic rhetorical
flourishes, the Court operatively defined arbitrary police
interference into the lives of people in bluelined minority
neighborhoods as constitutionally permissible crime interdiction.
In 2012, the Center for Constitutional Rights obtained class
certification in its suit, Floyd v. City of New York, which
challenged the constitutionality of the NYPD’s longstanding stopand-frisk program. The program peaked in 2011 with nearly
700,000 stops.157 While Terry rendered the bulk of stop and frisks
legal because of its low bar for suspicion, the Floyd plaintiffs
argued that the Department and City had tolerated widespread
violations of even Terry’s minimal standard and had
disproportionately targeted minorities in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. 158 The
plaintiffs presented statistics that of the 4.4 million stops between
2004 and 2012, over 80% were of Black and Latinx people while
10% were of Whites (all were mostly of men).159 For reference, New
York’s population in 2010 was 52% Black and Latinx and 33%
White. 160 Hundreds of the stops clearly lacked reasonable
articulable suspicion, and thousands of them were based on vague
and meaningless, but ostensibly constitutional, criteria like the

154. Id. at 125.
155. Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 139.
157. Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. https://ccrjustice.org/
home/what-we-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al [https://perma.cc/YSU7-XYC
E] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557–58, 572
n.100 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
158. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 556.
159. Id. at 556, 559, 561.
160. Id. at 559.
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person made a “furtive movement[]” or had a “[s]uspicious
[b]ulge.”161
Unsurprisingly, the police department insisted that these
dignity-harming and often violent encounters were necessary tools
of crime interdiction.162 Unsurprisingly, the data revealed that the
program was in fact wildly ineffective at interdicting crime. Fewer
than three percent of the stops resulted in the discovery of
weapons or contraband.163 The hit-rate numbers were even smaller
for minorities stopped by police.164 The police and city also justified
the stark racial disparities as a part of the crime-fighting mission.
According to them, the disparate racial impact of the stop-andfrisk program was merely a result of the department’s embrace of
data-driven policing methodologies.165 Police chiefs, they argued,
deployed officers to “high crime” areas with statistically higher
arrest rates. 166 They just also happened to be ones with high
concentrations of Black and Latinx people.167
The city’s argument does not, of course, explain why the police
also disproportionately targeted minorities in non-“high crime”
neighborhoods. Nor can it overcome the racist-arrest-informationin/racist-arrest-information-out problem or prove that the
overwhelmingly innocent Black people in a targeted neighborhood
were each statistically more crime-prone than the average
person. 168 “Why would the people stopped by the NYPD, both
criminal and law-abiding, so closely resemble the criminal
population—or, more precisely, the NYPD’s understanding of the
criminal population, based on its limited suspect data?” District
Court Judge Scheindlin queried. “A simple explanation exists,” she
161. Id.
162. Id. at 575.
163. Id. at 559.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 585, 591.
166. Id. at 585, 591 n.3.
167. Id. at 560.
168. The court observed,
Because the overwhelming majority of people stopped fell into the latter category,
there is no support for the City’s position that crime suspect data provides a
reliable proxy for the pool of people exhibiting suspicious behavior. Moreover,
given my finding that a significant number of stops were not based on reasonable
suspicion—and thus were stops drawn from the pool of non[]criminals not
exhibiting suspicious behavior—the use of crime suspect data as a benchmark for
the pool of people that would have been stopped in the absence of racial bias is
even less appropriate.
Id. at 586 (emphasis omitted); see also Harris, supra note 148, at 797 (police
disproportionately deploy to and use disparately aggressive tactics in Black
neighborhoods).
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ventured, “the racial composition of the people stopped by the
NYPD resembles what the NYPD perceives to be the racial
composition of the criminal population because that is why they
were stopped.”169
Indeed, during the course of litigation, a smoking gun piece of
evidence revealed that racialized social control, not individual
crime interdiction, was the point of the program. State Senator
Eric Adams testified that during a 2010 discussion of the stop-andfrisk program with New York City Police Commissioner Raymond
Kelly, Adams expressed concerns about the program’s racial
disparities.170 “Kelly responded that he focused on young Blacks
and Hispanics ‘because he wanted to instill fear in them, every
time they leave their home, they could be stopped by the police.’”171
The senator was “amazed” that Kelly was “comfortable enough to
say that.”172
Judge Scheindlin issued a landmark ruling that the NYPD,
through the stop-and-frisk program, for years had been violating
New Yorkers’ rights to be free from unlawful search and seizure
and unlawful racial discrimination. 173 Then-Mayor Michael
Bloomberg and the NYPD were furious, and they fought tooth and
nail against the judgment. 174 Bloomberg had always been
forthright about how he saw the NYPD. “I have my own army in
the NYPD,” he told a crowd in 2011, “which is the seventh biggest
army in the world.”175 In a dramatic turn of events, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a sua sponte order staying the
decision, remanding the case, and disqualifying Judge
Scheindlin.176 According to the court, the proceedings were tainted
by Judge Sheindlin’s bias against the police.177
What was the evidence of this bias? First, Judge Sheindlin
had requested the case and had indicated in her prior rulings her
169. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 588.
170. Id. at 606.
171. Id. (quoting Transcript of Record at 1589, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp.
2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 658–60, 664–67.
174. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-viol
ated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/XC6R-M2V6].
175. Hunter Walker, Mayor Bloomberg: ‘I Have My Own Army,’ OBSERVER (Nov. 30,
2011, 10:06 AM), https://observer.com/2011/11/mayor-bloomberg-i-have-my-own-army-11-3
0-11/ [https://perma.cc/4YFH-6TPV].
176. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part,
743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).
177. Id. at 127–29.
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belief that the stop-and-frisk program was ripe for a class-action
challenge.178 But this was hardly out of the ordinary. The Southern
District of New York had a long-standing “related case” rule where
judges were assigned cases similar to ones they had in the past.179
Second, Judge Scheindlin’s detractors argued, and the Second
Circuit agreed, that her statements to the press were
inappropriate. 180 She did speak to the press, in the face of
reporters’ requests for her to respond to Kelly and Bloomberg’s
relentless public attacks on her objectivity. 181 Here is her
“offending” statement in the New Yorker: “Too many judges,
especially because so many of our judges come out of [the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District], become government
judges . . . . I’m independent. I believe in the Constitution. I
believe in the Bill of Rights. These issues come up, and I take them
quite seriously. I’m not afraid to rule against the government.”182
Millions of stop and frisks and unnecessary arrests happen on
the streets of bluelined neighborhoods, and they nearly all proceed
with the full blessings of law. 183 The Floyd litigation was
exceptional, involving years of empirical research, newspaper
exposés on NYPD culture, and scores of impact litigators. And still,
the legal system ultimately did not have the capacity to recognize
the NYPD’s clearly discriminatory program as anything other
than ordinary crime interdiction. For plaintiffs to prevail on a
discrimination claim against an officer, they have to show that the
individual officer was an intentional racist who targeted the
plaintiff because of race. 184 Otherwise, the street policing that
disproportionately burdens, wounds, and even kills tens of
thousands of Black men every year is, in the eyes of the law, just
neutral crime fighting. It is business as usual.

178. See id. at 124–25.
179. See Joseph Goldstein, A Court Rule Directs Cases over Friskings to One Judge,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/nyregion/a-court-rule-direc
ts-cases-over-friskings-to-one-judge.html [https://perma.cc/UE8V-U3L3].
180. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 126–27.
181. Benjamin Weiser, Departing Judge Offers Blunt Defense of Ruling in Stop-andFrisk Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/nyregion/depar
ting-judge-offers-blunt-defense-of-ruling-that-ended-stop-and-frisk.html [https://perma.cc/
7VUX-VLDR].
182. Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and Wrongs: A Judge Takes On Stop-and-Frisk, NEW
YORKER (May 20, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27/rights-and-wro
ngs-2 [https://perma.cc/X92U-EYEB].
183. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
184. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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B. Brutality Is Business as Usual
Brutality is a critical part of the business of policing. It is
sanctioned and sanitized by law as a necessary component of the
police fulfilling their crime-control function. Interfacing with
people in “high crime areas” is dangerous business, the logic goes,
and the police must have the means to protect themselves. Police
must be armed with deadly weapons and have the “reasonable”
ability to use them and violent tactics like chokeholds to prevent
risks to themselves as they bring people to heel. Given this,
discriminatory police brutality is not a function of implicitly or
explicitly racist cops. It is simply the police, well, policing within
bluelined neighborhoods. 185 Researcher Michael Seigel analyzed
the data on police killings and found that the police’s
disproportionate use of deadly force on Black people is not
“primarily a function of individual-level factors, such as implicit
bias against Black individuals or the racial composition of the
police force.”186 Instead, it is “primarily a function of: (1) the degree
of historical structural racism in that location and (2) the degree
to which Black people living in that location are segregated into
neighborhoods with concentrated disadvantage.”187
The law encourages brutality in these policed spaces by
conferring on officers near absolute power to physically dominate
the individuals—Black or White—they encounter on the street.
The law makes clear that officers have no obligation to
countenance resistance. So ingrained in the law is this principle of
police domination that many courts, when examining whether an
officer killed in self-defense, refuse to consider whether the officer
unfairly detained the individual in the first place, wrongfully
escalated the situation, or provoked the force. Instead, courts
consider only whether the officer acted reasonably (had reasonable
fear) in the “split-second” moment when he pulled the trigger.188
185. This also means that brutality is also the business of policing White detainees.
Although there is some evidence that police use injurious force more often on Black
detainees, see, for example, id. at 559, White detainees are also subject to degradation and
brutality.
186. Siegel, supra note 98, at 1087.
187. Id.
188. E.g., Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146–48, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994); Dickerson v.
McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1161–62 (6th Cir. 1996); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–80
(4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim that an officer who resorts to deadly force in self-defense
nevertheless violates the Fourth Amendment if he unreasonably provokes the shooting by
failing properly to identify himself as a police officer); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333
(8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to consider “the events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness
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Such was the argument advanced by Cuyahoga County
prosecutor Timothy McGinty to convince a grand jury not to indict
Timothy Loehmann, the officer who killed Tamir Rice. 189 The
killing occurred after Loehmann’s partner drove off the road, onto
the grass, and right up to the park pavilion where the baby-faced,
twelve-year-old Black tween was playing with a toy gun. Within
seconds of the squad car pulling up, and without any conversation,
investigation, or pause, Loehmann shot out the passenger side,
extinguishing Tamir’s life.190 District Attorney McGinty, breaking
the case up into split-second intervals, successfully argued that
the sole moment that mattered out of the entire series of
outrageous police actions leading to the child’s death was when the
officer fired the fatal shot.191 At that moment, McGinty asserted,
Loehmann could have believed that Tamir was about to point a
real gun at him.192 Thus, regardless of the overall absurdity of the
police’s actions, in that one moment, the officer may have felt
threatened, so the killing was “reasonable.”193
This longstanding legal sanitization of brutality can be traced,
in part, to events that occurred on a November day in 1984 when
Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, experienced a sudden insulin
reaction. Graham rushed into a convenience store to get an orange
juice. Finding the line too long, he rushed back out of the store and
into his friend William Berry’s car to go to a nearby friend’s
house.194 Charlotte, North Carolina police officer M.S. Connor was
under the Fourth Amendment”); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991)
(focusing on the moment the officers make the “split-second judgments” and not on the
events leading up to the to a shooting); Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805–06 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (looking at the split second before the officer made a decision).
189. TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY ET AL., OFF. OF THE PROSECUTING ATT’Y, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR
RICE 1, 35, 60, 70 (2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Ric
e%20Case%20Report%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27L-K6CC]
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; see also Dan Turkel, Tamir Rice’s Family Accuses Prosecutor
of ‘Manipulating’ Grand Jury to Get Cops Out of Indictment for 12-Year-Old’s Death,
INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ohio-prosecutor-tamirrice-said-to-be-trying-to-lose-2015-12 [https://perma.cc/F93E-ENUD].
190. Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by
Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2
015/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/SMD5-HT55]; see also Safia Samee Ali, Tamir Rice Shooting: Newly
Released Interview Reveals Cop’s Shifting Story, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:45 PM), https:
//www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/newly-released-interview-footage-reveal-shifting-storie
s-officers-who-shot-n751401 [https://perma.cc/2KVN-VFG6].
191. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 189, at 41–56.
192. Id. at 66–68.
193. Id. at 66.
194. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388–89 (1989).
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watching and regarded Graham’s quick departure from the store
as “suspicious.” He followed Berry’s car and then initiated a Terry
stop.195 After being pulled over, Berry explained to Connor that
Graham was having a diabetic reaction and asked the officer to get
the sick man some sugar.196
Connor was unmoved by Berry’s exhortations. He ordered the
two to wait while he contacted the store to investigate and called
for backup.197 Graham ran out of the car and passed out on the
sidewalk. When backup arrived, Berry pleaded to Connor and the
other officers to help Graham and give him sugar. They ignored
Berry, instead taking Graham’s hands and cuffing them tightly,
as the sick man lay prone on the ground.198 One officer remarked,
“I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like
this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the motherfucker but drunk. Lock
the son of a bitch up.”199 Graham mustered the energy to tell the
officers to check for the diabetic seal in his wallet. The police
responded by yelling “shut up,” shoving Graham’s face against the
car hood, and throwing him head-first into the squad car.200
Graham sustained severe injuries and sued the police
department. The case went to a jury trial, where the judge directed
a verdict for the police, ruling that no reasonable juror could find
that the police used unconstitutional excessive force.201 According
to the judge, a finding of excessive force required the jury to
conclude that the police acted “maliciously and sadistically,”
which, in the judge’s mind, no rational jury could.202 Eventually,
the Supreme Court reversed that ruling on the ground that an
officer’s subjective maliciousness is not the test for excessive
force.203 However, the Court’s objective reasonableness standard is
hardly more protective and left plenty of room for continued police
brutality. 204 The Court opined, “The ‘reasonableness’ of a
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
195. Id. at 389.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. The language from the case reads, “Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F. but
drunk. Lock the S.B. up.” Because this abbreviation is reflective of the Court and litigators’
evaluation of linguistic propriety over accuracy, I have chosen to spell out the epithets in
full to accurately capture the contempt the officer had for Graham.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 390–91.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 397.
204. Id. at 396.
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reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.”205 It went on to say that the officer must be allowed
“to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force
that is necessary in a particular situation” and “[a]n officer’s evil
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force.” 206 The Court remanded the
case, and it went back to trial. The jury found for the police,
concluding that the gratuitously violent and degrading actions of
Connor and his compatriots were, in the end, objectively
reasonable.207
In Graham v. Connor, as in Terry, racialized suspicion was
perfectly compatible with constitutional reasonableness. The
Graham Court did not bother to question Connor’s belief that
Graham’s hasty departure from a store was suspicious enough to
merit following Berry’s car and engaging in a prolonged
investigative stop. One may not be surprised that Dethorne
Graham was Black, a detail distinctly omitted from the Supreme
Court’s recitation of the facts.208 In the end, the Court mandated
strong deference to all police “judgments.” This apparently
includes the judgment that Black men leaving stores quickly must
be thieves and the judgment that vulnerable, dying men pleading
for their lives are really just lying “motherfuckers.” What is the
point of crying, “I can’t breathe” eleven times, as Eric Garner
did,209 or twenty times, as George Floyd did,210 if the law says that

205. Id.
206. Id. at 397.
207. Charles Lane, Opinion, A 1989 Supreme Court Ruling Is Unintentionally
Providing Cover for Police Brutality, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020, 5:57 PM), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/opinions/a-1989-supreme-court-ruling-is-unintentionally-providing-cover
-for-police-brutality/2020/06/08/91cc7b0c-a9a7-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9_story.html [https:
//perma.cc/5BWH-WZZR].
208. Id.; see also Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth
Amendment: Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical
Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1465, 1496–97 (2018) (arguing that
the Court’s omission was a deliberate move to ensure that excessive force analysis took
place under the Fourth Amendment standard, which made it a matter of individual actions,
rather than Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, which could have permitted a
broader assessment of police practices).
209. Ashley Southall, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 5 Years After Eric Garner’s Death, an Officer
Faces Trial, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/nyregion/e
ric-garner-death-daniel-pantaleo-chokehold.html [https://perma.cc/WK3L-XEQJ]; MATT
TAIBBI, I CAN’T BREATHE: A KILLING ON BAY STREET 120 (2017).
210. Maanvi Singh, George Floyd Told Officers ‘I Can’t Breathe’ More than 20 Times,
Transcripts Show, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2020, 12:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-ne
ws/2020/jul/08/george-floyd-police-killing-transcript-i-cant-breathe [https://perma.cc/4KLG
-9KCY].
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reasonable officers can ignore the cries as the ramblings of
deceptive, intoxicated, or crazy “sons of bitches”?
In recent months, we have witnessed appalling cases where
individuals’ heart-wrenching pleas fell on cops’ deaf ears. George
Floyd cried out to his mother, and Elijah McClain begged:
I can’t breathe. I have my ID right here. My name is Elijah
McClain. That’s my house. I was just going home. I’m an
introvert. I’m just different. That’s all. I’m so sorry. I have no
gun. I don’t do that stuff. I don’t do any fighting. Why are you
attacking me? I don’t even kill flies! I don’t eat meat! But I
don’t judge people, I don’t judge people who do eat meat.
Forgive me. All I was trying to do was become better. I will
do it. I will do anything. Sacrifice my identity, I’ll do it. You
all are phenomenal. You are beautiful and I love you. Try to
forgive me. I’m a mood Gemini. I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. Ow,
that really hurt. You are all very strong. Teamwork makes
the dream work. Oh, I’m sorry I wasn’t trying to do that. I
just can’t breathe correctly.211
Aurora, Colorado, police stopped and ultimately killed
McClain, a gentle, cat-loving, violin-playing, twenty-three-yearold Black man, simply because a passing driver thought McClain’s
manner of dress and walking was suspicious.212 Through the din
of the police pinning, reprimanding, and threatening to set dogs
on him, a terrified, vomiting McClain tried to explain: “I was just
going home. . . . I’m just different. . . . I have no gun. I don’t do that
stuff. . . . I don’t even kill flies! I don’t even eat meat!”213 Elijah
McClain experienced this Terry stop and his last breath on August
24, 2019.214
Three days later, an officer from that same Aurora, Colorado,
department, Levi Huffine, arrested Shataeah Kelly for a
municipal violation (a minor misdemeanor) stemming from a
fight.215 Kelly yelled and cussed at the officer while he took her
into custody, so Huffine decided to hog tie the twenty-eight-year211. Dan Evon, Are These Elijah McClain’s Last Words on Police Video?, SNOPES (June
26, 2020), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/elijah-mcclains-last-words/ [https://perma.cc/
2ETB-HGBD].
212. Lucy Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html
[https://perma.cc/JCB2-RSD4].
213. Evon, supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. Fired Aurora Police Officer Levi Huffine Appeals Termination After Hobbling
Woman, CBS DENVER (Nov. 11, 2020, 5:09 PM), https://denver.cbslocal.com/2020/11/11/levihuffine-fired-shataeah-kelly-aurora-police-officer-lawsuit-hobbling/ [https://perma.cc/FW7
T-QTU5].
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old woman, tethering her feet and hands together behind her back.
Kelly ended up face down the floor with her feet toward the roof in
the backseat of the cruiser.216 The weight of her body pressed on
her head and neck. “Officer please, I can’t breathe,” Kelly cried. “I
don’t want to die like this. I’m about to break my neck.”217 Huffine
ignored her cries and left her in that deadly position for twentyone minutes. Experts say Kelly is lucky to be alive.218 As the ride
proceeded, Kelly became increasingly panicked, pleading, “My
neck is killing me dude. Help me, I can’t breathe.” Finally, in
desperation, the Black woman implored of the White police officer,
“I beg you master.”219
Incidents like these are frequently characterized as
outrageous violations of the law, but the law of Graham and its
progeny tell another story. These incidents are violations of moral
conscience, but they are aided and abetted by law. Officers
detaining Black people for innocuous behavior is reasonable
seizure. Officers violently restraining detainees is reasonable
force. Officers disbelieving and ignoring detainees’ cries to dial
back the restraint is reasonable judgment in the field. As Butler
counsels, “The problem is not illegal police misconduct; the
problem is legal police conduct.”220
We also might be tempted to believe that, regardless of
whether these brutality incidents are legal, they are not standard
practice but the rogue actions of particularly “malicious and
sadistic” individuals.221 Such a presumption underlies claims that
police violence will be remedied when departments adopt early
warning systems and share bad-cop registries. The abusive
language used in Graham might seem to confirm the idea that
police violence is gratuitous and gleeful. Moreover, police brutality
may seem deviant because killings—statistic outliers—receive all
the publicity.222
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Brian Maass, ‘Please Don’t Let Me Die Back Here’; Aurora Police Video Released
of Woman Cuffed, Hobbled in Back of Patrol Car, CBS DENVER (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:58 PM),
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2020/09/29/shataean-kelly-levi-huffine-aurora-police-video-rele
ased-woman-struggling-back-patrol-car/ [https://perma.cc/NX5F-K74L].
219. Brian Maass, Aurora Officer Fired Over Video Speaks: ‘I Told Her to Shut Up,’
CBS DENVER (Oct. 1, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://denver.cbslocal.com/2020/10/01/levi-huffineaurora-police/ [https://perma.cc/93VY-CENR].
220. Paul Butler, Keynote Speaker, Police in America: Ensuring Accountability and
Mitigating Racial Bias, 11 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 385, 386 (2017).
221. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
222. See Sarah DeGue et al., Deaths Due To Use of Lethal Force by Law Enforcement,
51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S173, S175, S182 (2016).
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But look more carefully at the chokehold videos. They are
horrific and tragic, sad and revolting, but not because the officers
are in a frenzied orgy of gratuitous violence. These cases are so
horrifying because the victims are crying out, vomiting, begging,
and dying. But the officers themselves are just steadily and
resolutely using their department-approved carotid holds and
restraint techniques and casually directing onlookers away. This
brutality is banal. It is routine. It is standard practice when people
do not softly submit. It is “split-second judgment[] . . . about the
amount of force that is necessary.”223 Accordingly, Professor Devon
Carbado argues that we should not “think of police killings of
African Americans as aberrant and extraordinary, failing to see
their connections to the routine, to the everyday, and to the
ordinary.”224
From the roving police gangs of old, the police have always
trafficked in brutality. And while professionalization reduced
some of the more gratuitous, messy, and disorganized violence, it
also formalized violence as a best practice. Police training, now
highly official and bureaucratized, ingrains in cadets the notion
that people in bluelined neighborhoods—the ones officers are
directed to constantly interface with—are invariably lethal and
wily killers in disguise. They are walking bundles of deadly risk.
The training says that it is kill-or-be-killed out there, which
explains why many “police involved” shootings are perpetrated by
anxiety-ridden rookies terrified that victims’ innocuous behavior
is really a deadly threat. Former officer and policing expert Seth
Stoughton writes that training instills a “warrior worldview, [in
which] officers are locked in intermittent and unpredictable
combat with unknown but highly lethal enemies.”225 The Aurora
officers who accosted Elijah McClain described the 140-pound,
wouldn’t-hurt-a-fly, vegetarian as preternaturally strong and
perhaps hopped up on drugs—a description that encouraged
paramedics to administer a deadly dose of ketamine, enough for a
190-pound person.226
223. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
224. Carbado, supra note 148, at 128.
225. Stoughton, supra note 19, at 227; see also Seth W. Stoughton, U. S.C. SCH. L., http
s://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/law/faculty_and_staff/directory/stoughton_seth.php [https
://perma.cc/NW5T-7Z36] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
226. See Tompkins, supra note 212; see, e.g., Anna Starostinetskaya, Police Killing of
23-Year-Old Vegetarian Elijah McClain Goes National amid Black Lives Matter Protests,
VEGNEWS (June 24, 2020), https://vegnews.com/2020/6/police-killing-of-23-year-old-vegetar
ian-elijah-mcclain-goes-national-amid-black-lives-matter-protests [https://perma.cc/5ULH-

58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021)

2021]

THE POLICE AND “BLUELINING”

909

To be sure, many endorse the popular idea that police are in
the riskiest business, and this idea is constantly reaffirmed to
officers in their training. Stoughton observes:
From their earliest days in the academy, would-be officers
are told that their prime objective, the proverbial “first rule
of law enforcement,” is to go home at the end of every shift.
But they are taught that they live in an intensely hostile
world. A world that is, quite literally, gunning for them. As
early as the first day of the police academy, the dangers
officers face are depicted in graphic and heart-wrenching
recordings that capture a fallen officer’s last moments.227
In reality, an officer’s risk of being killed by a suspect is not high.
In 2019, “[forty-eight] officers died [in the line of duty] as a result
of felonious acts.” Compare that to the 999 people police shot and
killed.228 Police are approximately twenty-one times more likely to
kill a person than be killed. 229 As of September, “on-the-job
coronavirus infections” killed more police officers in 2020 than
shootings, “car accidents, and all other causes combined.”230 The
risk of on-the-job fatality for police officers is lower than that for
fishers, loggers, pilots, roofers, garbage collectors, steel workers,
drivers, farmers, and landscapers.231

5WLU]; Erik Ortiz, Elijah McClain Was Injected with Ketamine While Handcuffed. Some
Experts Worry About Its Use During Police Calls, NBC NEWS (July 3, 2020, 7:20 PM), https:/
/www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/elijah-mcclain-was-injected-ketamine-while-handcuffed
-some-medical-experts-n1232697 [https://perma.cc/2VZT-58PA]; Karen Gardner, Opinion,
Columnist Karen Gardner: The Justice They Are Due, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (July 8,
2020, 8:05 AM), https://www.gazettenet.com/Columnist-Karen-Gardner-35110647 [https://
perma.cc/GXP6-YQNX].
227. Stoughton, supra note 19, at 226–27 (footnotes omitted).
228. FBI Releases 2019 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of
Duty, FBI NAT’L PRESS OFF. (May 4, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-release
s/fbi-releases-2019-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty [https:/
/perma.cc/359L-BGAY]; Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ [https://perma.cc/RV8E-36KA]
(last updated Aug. 10, 2020).
229. Madeline Heim, Yes, Police Were 20.8 More Likely to Kill than Be Killed by a
Criminal in 2019, POLITIFACT (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/a
ug/27/chris-larson/yes-police-were-208-more-likely-kill-be-killed-cri/ [https://perma.cc/Y7A
Z-8JTS].
230. Christopher Ingraham, Covid-19 Has Killed More Police Officers This Year than
All Other Causes Combined, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020, 12:29 PM), https://ww
w.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/02/coronavirus-deaths-police-officers-2020/ [http
s://perma.cc/CN5G-FJ3C].
231. Andy Kiersz & Madison Hoff, The 34 Deadliest Jobs in America, BUS. INSIDER
(June 3, 2020, 8:08 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-dangerous-jobs-in-ame
rica-2018-7#11-electrical-power-line-installers-and-repairers-24 [https://perma.cc/6ZVC-W
6KN].
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Complementing—or perhaps offsetting—training messages
that induce stress and fear, such as “you could die today,
tomorrow, or next Friday,”232 are messages about the virtues and
pleasures of being a professional violence dealer. On October 30,
2020, Satchel Walton and Cooper Walton, two high school students
at duPont Manuel High School in Louisville, Kentucky, published
an article in the school paper that would soon make the
Washington Post, send shockwaves through the internet, and elicit
reactions from the highest levels of the Kentucky government.233
The students published a copy of a PowerPoint presentation, “The
Warrior Mindset,” which was used in the aughts for cadet training
at the Kentucky State Police Academy. A civil rights lawyer had
obtained the material from an open records request during
litigation.234 He passed it along to the students, who published the
PowerPoint in full along with their article. The part of the training
materials that was most shocking was the quote, “[T]he very first
essential for success is a perpetually constant and regular
employment of violence.” 235 Of course, any such lionization of
violence is concerning, but what really shocked people of all stripes
was the fact that the person who wrote those words was Adolf
Hitler. They came straight out of Mein Kampf.236

232. Stoughton, supra note 19, at 227 (quoting Uriel J. Garcia, Experts Say Strongly
Worded Police Curriculum Is Risky with Cadets, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Mar. 22, 2014),
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/experts-say-strongly-worded-police-c
urriculum-is-risky-with-cadets/article_6fcb7d45-436c-5e48-aa06-2fc6fdcc35a1.html [http://
perma.cc/FBQ2-LYTP]).
233. Satchel Walton & Cooper Walton, KSP Training Slideshow Quotes Hitler,
Advocates ‘Ruthless’ Violence, MANUAL REDEYE (Oct. 30, 2020), https://manualredeye.com/9
0096/news/local/police-training-hitler-presentation/#modal-photo [https://perma.cc/S3ZPMZSC]; Jacyln Peiser, Kentucky State Police Quoted Hitler and Encouraged Cadets to be
‘Ruthless’ in a Training Program, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2020, 4:23 AM), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/nation/2020/11/02/kentucky-state-police-hitler-slideshow/ [https://perma.cc/P
7YJ-ZR2C]; Celine Castronuovo, Kentucky Governor Condemns Use of Hitler Quotes in
Uncovered Police Training Manual, HILL (Oct. 31, 2020, 12:15 PM), https://thehill.com/hom
enews/state-watch/523760-kentucky-governor-condemns-use-of-hitler-quotes-in-uncovered
-police [https://perma.cc/BU5H-KNSY].
234. Walton & Walton, supra note 233.
235. Id.
236. See id.
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Figure 1.

The PowerPoint—and I recommend that you peruse it in
full—fetishizes hypermasculinity and militarism at its best. Set on
a background of Americana symbolism, all eagles and waving
flags, it features a plethora of military battle imagery and
depictions of men exercising paternalistic protection, disciplined
strength, and religious calling. The number one thing a “[w]arrior
[m]ust [p]rotect,” it declares, is “[r]eligious [f]aith.” 237 The
document is peppered with sentimental pictures of civilian women
and children juxtaposed with highly costumed, heavily armed,
White, male soldiers in battle stances. 238 “Truth and manliness
will carry you through the world much better than policy, or tact,

237. Id.
238. Id. James Gilligan observes,
The male gender role generates violence by exposing men to shame if they are not
violent, and rewarding them with honor when they are. The female gender role
also stimulates male violence at the same time that it inhibits female violence. It
does this by restricting women to the role of highly unfree sex objects, and
honoring them to the degree that they submit to those roles or shaming them when
they rebel. This encourages men to treat women as sex objects, and encourages
women to conform to that sex role; but it also encourages women (and men) to
treat men as violence objects. It also encourages a man to become violent if the
woman to whom he is related or married “dishonors” him by acting in ways that
transgress her prescribed sexual role.
JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC 233 (Vintage Books
1997) (1996).

58 HOUS. L. REV. 867 (2021)

912

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[58:4

or expediency,” the PowerPoint counsels, quoting Robert E. Lee.239
The presentation emphasizes that the police officer-warrior stands
above all others in society and his use of violence is more than
community protection—it is God’s work. One slide declares, “If we
had no engineers or no doctors for a generation, it would be
difficult. But if we had no warriors, in a single generation we
would be both damned and doomed.”240
The messages of the PowerPoint often read as wildly
inconsistent, encouraging both constant brutal violence and
disciplined strength, even turning the other cheek. But in the end,
the training reflects the dynamic I mentioned above, namely that
brutality is the everyday business of policing. Within this policing
culture and mindset, the officer is a “ruthless killer,” not for
pleasure or because he is out of control, but as a matter of
professional course. “The cultural image of a police officer,” Harris
opines, “is a uniquely valuable and rare kind of man: tough and
violent, yet heroic, protective, and necessary to society’s very
survival.”241
It is thus quite fitting that the presentation quotes Hitler’s
views of violence. Philosopher Hannah Arendt famously discussed
the “banality of evil,” exemplified by the Nazi genocidaire, who sits
in his neat office with his loving family and classical music and
orders the extermination of millions of innocent adults and
children.242 The Nazi is the ultimate “loving father, spouse, and
friend, as well as ruthless killer,” in the words of the PowerPoint.243
Jungian psychologist Marie-Louise von Franz observed, “Goering
[a high-ranking Nazi] without a qualm . . . could sign the death
sentence for three hundred people, but if one of his birds died, then
that fat old man would cry. . . . Cold brutality is very often covered
up by sentimentality.”244
239. See Walton & Walton, supra note 233.
240. Id. Sociologist Karen Pyke observes that “white heterosexual middle- and upperclass men who occupy order-giving positions in the institutions they control—particularly
economic, political, and military institutions—produce a hegemonic masculinity that is
glorified throughout the culture.” Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The
Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 527, 531
(1996).
241. Harris, supra note 148, at 793.
242. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 9, 204 (1963); Hannah Arendt, PHIL. TALK (June 22, 2008), https://www.philosophytal
k.org/shows/hannah-arendt [https://perma.cc/5TP9-449P].
243. See Walton & Walton, supra note 233.
244. MARIE-LOUISE VON FRANZ, THE PROBLEM OF THE PUER AETERNUS 13 (2000); see
also Marie-Louise von Franz, C.G. JUNG INST. CHI., https://jungchicago.org/store/index.php?
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Of course, one might respond that a presentation that openly
quotes Hitler, not once but twice, is an outlier. (The PowerPoint
also invokes Hitler’s quote, “It is always more difficult to fight
against faith than against knowledge,” to drive home the point
that police officers must internalize the warrior value system as
faith so as to “eliminate[] HESITATION!”).245 And, to be sure, it is
probably unusual for a training PowerPoint to end with a slide
that simply states, “Über Alles.” The phrase comes from
“Deutchschland Über Alles,” the first verse of the old German
national anthem, which Hitler used to assert Germany’s
superiority over other countries and Germans’ superiority over
other races.246 Immediately after World War II, “Über Alles” was
banned as part of Germany’s de-Nazification program, and the
country permanently removed it from the national anthem.247 To
be sure, such an open and honest embrace of Nazi-style militaristic
authoritarianism is not evident in most police training material,
and indeed police training is local and heterodox. Nevertheless,
police departments typically emphasize the necessity and duty of
using violence to control citizen-enemies and the dangers they
pose, even if such sentiments are not dressed up in fascist finery.

route=product/manufacturer/info&manufacturer_id=32
[https://perma.cc/R2VZ-NLCS]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2021); High-Ranking Nazi Leader Hermann Göring Dies, HISTORY
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hermann-goering-dies [https://
perma.cc/J5FV-WJBW].
245. See Walton & Walton, supra note 233.
246. Id.; see also Daniel A. Gross, “Deutschland Über Alles” and “America First,” in
Song, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/deuts
chland-uber-alles-and-america-first-in-song [https://perma.cc/RR9U-EKZ4].
247. Gross, supra note 246.
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Figure 2.

By concentrating on training, I do not mean to deny that there
are certain officers who, as individuals, have an outlying
attraction to violence. Because policing is a well-known profession
of violence and control, it attracts men—and it is overwhelmingly
men—who find particular allure in physical domination.248 Within
police ranks, we see many former military personnel and,
according to recent media reports, a disturbing number of militant
White supremacists. 249 Indeed, the toxic masculinity of police
officers is a subject of frequent scholarly rumination.250 My point,
248. See Leigh Goodmark, Hands Up at Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police
Officers Who Commit Intimate Partner Abuse, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1183, 1210–11 (2015);
Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB10001424127887323848804578608040780519904 [https://perma.cc/VW2V
-VYQ3].
249. Simone Weichselbaum, Police with Military Experience More Likely to Shoot,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2018, 3:22 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/
15/police-with-military-experience-more-likely-to-shoot
[https://perma.cc/4E93-GTBR];
Vets to Cops, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: COPS OFF., https://cops.usdoj.gov/vetstocops [https://per
ma.cc/ZN7E-CEYS]; Glenn French, 4 Reasons Why Military Veterans Make Great Cops,
POLICE1 (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.police1.com/police-jobs-and-careers/articles/4-reasons
-why-military-veterans-make-great-cops-CXnbR6T9Kub4OwdK/ [https://perma.cc/HR8YVV7N]; Sam Levin, White Supremacists and Militias Have Infiltrated Police Across US,
Report Says, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2
020/aug/27/white-supremacists-militias-infiltrate-us-police-report [https://perma.cc/2ZP4VQB8]; Grace Tatter & Meghna Chakrabarti, What’s the Connection Between Civilian
Militias and the Police?, WBUR: ON POINT (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/20
20/09/01/right-wing-militias-and-police [https://perma.cc/PC2G-EZ6U].
250. See Harris, supra note 148, at 793; Jennifer Brown, From Cult of Masculinity to
Smart Macho: Gender Perspectives on Police Occupational Culture, in 8 SOCIO. OF CRIME,
L. & DEVIANCE 189, 200 (2007); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s The Man?”: Masculinities
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however, is that the long-existing police brutality now under
public scrutiny has never been just a problem of rogue White
supremacists. There is a violence feedback loop that has been
revolving for decades: policing is violent; that violence attracts
those enamored with violence; many of these individuals become
police officials; police officials codify violence as policy and ingrain
it as practice; police officers train on violence policy and practice;
officers are violent on the street, reinforcing that policing is
violent; rinse and repeat.
Perhaps no other facet of policing so clearly exemplifies how
policing structures and institutions reflect and reinforce the fearbased, masculinist, and raced glorification of police violence than
SWAT. Journalist Radley Balko, in his seminal book on police
militarization, Rise of the Warrior Cop, traces the development of
SWAT in the late twentieth century. SWAT programs, which
gained notoriety from clashes with the Black Panthers and the
Symbionese Liberation Army in the 1960s and 1970s, grew
exponentially during the war-on-crime era of the ’80s and ’90s.251
In addition to its domestic political aspects, the war on crime, and
particularly Reagan’s war on drugs, had a geopolitical face that
was no less ideological, political, and economic. Reagan’s—and
later Bush’s—transnational drug interdiction program was
intimately intertwined with Cold War-era politics in Latin
America. It integrated military operations and domestic law
enforcement both abroad and at home. 252 Surplus military
equipment—a narrative of urban areas besieged by gangs and
drugs—private ex-military contractors, and a glut of grants
flowing from the government hastened the rapid militarization of
domestic law enforcement.253
SWAT and its military-style “raids” became normal in
domestic policing, generating its own cultural iconography and

Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 674, 676 (2009);
Steve Herbert, ‘Hard Charger’ or ‘Station Queen’? Policing and the Masculinist State, 8
GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 55, 56–58 (2001).
251. RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP 147–48, 154, 157, 168 (2013); Swat
Teams, JRANK, https://law.jrank.org/pages/10652/Swat-Teams.html [https://perma.cc/WY3
6-43H9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021); see also discussion supra Section II.B (discussing the
tough on crime era of the ’80s and ’90s); Radley Balko, PUBLICAFFAIRS, https://www.public
affairsbooks.com/contributor/radley-balko/ [https://perma.cc/5UEC-DBXZ] (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021).
252. BALKO, supra note 251, at 177–78.
253. Id. at 139, 145, 147, 152; Joseph B. Doherty, Note, Us vs. Them: The
Militarization of American Law Enforcement and the Psychological Effect on Police Officers
& Civilians, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 415, 423–25 (2016).
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popular following. The SWAT team model filtered down to the
smallest of local police departments. Balko explains:
Logan, Utah, is a typical example of the phenomenon. As of
2011, the city had just under 50,000 people, hadn’t had a
murder in five years, and had recently been rated the “safest
city in America.” Yet, since the mid-1980s, Logan has had its
own SWAT team. What does a SWAT team do in a city with
no violent crime? It creates violence out of nonviolent crime.
“We haven’t really had a whole lot of barricaded subjects, and
certainly we haven’t had an active gunman shooter,” a
department spokesman told the local paper. . . . In the
meantime, he said, it’s “mostly used for assistance on highrisk search warrants”—“high-risk” meaning all or most drug
warrants. “We’ve destroyed some doors over the years that
maybe wouldn’t have gotten destroyed if there wasn’t a
SWAT team, but it’s all in the name of trying to make a highrisk situation more safe for everyone.”254
The militarized violence of SWAT has become an ordinary facet of
everyday crime interdiction, so much so that, until recently, the
public rarely questioned the propriety of a kick-down-the-door raid
when a “drug den” search was at issue. But upon even a second of
reflection, a lay person can see the obvious: a bunch of heavily
armed men storming a house in the middle of the night when
people are likely to be home and startled is about the most
dangerous way to execute a warrant. Moreover, hastily slapped
together drug raids produce worse evidence than more timeconsuming investigative techniques, such as undercover
operations and controlled buys.255
In more candid moments, the police admit that the SWAT raid
model is not a particularly safe or effective way to execute
narcotics warrants. A former ICE agent and veteran of numerous
SWAT narcotics, laundering, and human trafficking raids
forthrightly told Balko, “The thing is, it’s so much safer to wait the
suspect out.” He went on, “Waiting people out is just so much
better. You’ve done your investigation, so you know their routine.

254. BALKO, supra note 251, at 207–08.
255. Dara Lind, Cops Do 20,000 No-Knock Raids a Year. Civilians Often Pay the Price
When They Go Wrong., VOX (May 15, 2015, 12:12 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/29/708
3371/swat-no-knock-raids-police-killed-civilians-dangerous-work-drugs [https://perma.cc/Q
Z5D-VA97]; Kevin Sack, Door-Busting Drug Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-warrant-drug-r
aid.html [https://perma.cc/278Y-PKNH].
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So you wait until the guy leaves, and you do a routine traffic stop
and you arrest him.”256
However, such sensible investigations do not have the allure
to cops or the public of the image of SWAT officers—bedecked in
authoritarian finery, using secretive hand signals and high-tech
equipment to storm a Section 8 apartment like an ISIS bunker.
One former narcotics officer confessed, “Oh, it’s a huge
rush. . . . Those times when you do have to kick down a door, it’s
just a big shot of adrenaline.”257 Another warned that violent drug
interdiction could be addictive: “It’s a rush. And you have to be
careful, because the raids themselves can be habit-forming.”258 In
this sense, SWAT is more about masculine performance than selfprotection. As Angela Harris asserts, “If much of the violence of
the criminal justice state emerges from state actors’ own needs to
prove their masculinity rather than from the necessity of
preventing and punishing crime, then the criminal justice state is,
in this sense, a protection racket.”259
The SWAT program serves the function of paying officers the
nonmonetary wages of masculinist domination. In addition, home
raids serve to strictly control the spatial and social place of people
in bluelined neighborhoods. They function like the stop-and-frisk
program designed by Commissioner Kelly to communicate to male
New Yorkers of color that the police own the streets. 260 SWAT
raids, like “[m]any contemporary policing and punitive
practices . . . communicate a racial and political, rather than
moral, message—a message about who is in control and about who
gets controlled,” in the words of theorist Bernard Harcourt. 261
Frequent home raids tell residents that they do not even have
sanctuary in the privacy of their “castles.” Police make it clear that
they will not reserve violent SWAT tactics for the occasional highrisk search but will use them at will to informally punish suspects
in their homes. The existence of SWAT tells targeted residents
that there is nowhere to hide. The Barton County, Kansas, Sherriff
put out a public service announcement depicting a group of officers
256. BALKO, supra note 251, at 214.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Harris, supra note 148, at 800.
260. Ashley Southall & Michael Gold, Why “Stop-and-Frisk” Inflamed Black and
Hispanic Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/
nyregion/bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/7TCQ-BRVW].
261. Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the
Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function
of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 168 (2001).
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in full riot gear and warning, “If you use drugs . . . [w]e make
house calls.”262
Figure 3.

With militarization the norm, the police power to brutally
maintain people in their “place” is at its zenith. Militarism is now
an integral and critical part of how American policing dominates
civilians, giving us the absurd sight of domestic law enforcers, clad
in light tan camouflage designed for soldiers engaged in Middle
East desert warfare, patrolling the humid city streets of downtown
Portland. Balko laments that we have become “a country where it
has become acceptable for armed government agents dressed in
battle garb to storm private homes in the middle of the night—not
to apprehend violent fugitives or thwart terrorist attacks, but to
enforce laws against nonviolent, consensual activities.” He decries
that “order is preserved by armed government agents too often
conditioned to see streets and neighborhoods as battlefields and
the citizens they serve as the enemy.”263 But this dystopian reality
is not what we have become; it is the latest iteration of what has
always been.

262. Russell Edem, $100,000 in Methamphetamine Seized by Joint Law Enforcement
Agencies, GREAT BEND TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:51 PM), https://www.gbtribune.com/news/loc
al-news/100000-in-methamphetamine-seized-by-joint-law-enforcement-agencies/ [https://p
erma.cc/2266-S2JH] (containing a statement from the Baron County Sheriff that the police
make house calls for drug traffickers).
263. BALKO, supra note 251, at xiv.
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IV. THE POISONED PROMISE OF PROSECUTION
Racialized police brutality, from everyday mistreatment to
highly publicized murders, takes an immense emotional and
physical toll on the victims directly involved and the larger Black
community. Many Black people harbor an intense desire to see
officers who kill or harm civilians swiftly prosecuted, convicted,
and imprisoned. In the aftermath of killings of innocents like
Breonna Taylor, society demands the state hold wrongdoers
accountable through prosecution and imprisonment.264 Professor
Barbara Armacost observes, “People are dead and we thirst for
justice. ‘Officers must be held accountable,’ we cry.”265 To be sure,
crime victims of all kinds tend to equate justice with the
incarceration of those who have wronged them. This “punitive
impulse” is strong and compelling, but activists should bear in
mind that criminal prosecution of individual bad-apple cops holds
little promise of upending the structures that maintain policing as
an institution of racial, social, and economic control. 266 And an
agenda myopically focused on individual criminal prosecution
may, in fact, strengthen that institution.
Proponents of cop prosecution as a means of reform make the
facially intuitive argument that incarcerating individual officers
will provide redress to victims and disincentivize brutality,
thereby rendering the criminal system fairer and less violent.267
Throughout time, progressive lawmakers and activists have
sought to use criminal prosecution to fight injustices and, at the
same time, balance the criminal system by making it more
punitive toward Whites and more responsive to victims of color.
Murakawa observes that “[t]he combination of a meager welfare
state but a capacious carceral state ha[s] led interest groups to rely
on criminal justice for social change.”268 Part of the explanation is
that “reformers tend to build on or adapt existing institutional
structures; destroying and building anew is costly, requires
challeng[ing] entrenched interests, and poses coordination

264. Loralei HoJay, Justice for Breonna Taylor, CHANGE, https://www.change.org/p/an
dy-beshear-justice-for-breonna-taylor [https://perma.cc/MRP9-XN4M] (last visited Jan. 7,
2021).
265. Armacost, supra note 19, at 909.
266. See Race to Incarcerate, supra note 13, at 1016, 1021 (describing the American
“punitive impulse”).
267. See Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 22–23) (surveying the rhetoric and
activism favoring police prosecution).
268. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 17.
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problems.”269 And, as the controversy over the “defund the police”
movement has shown, tearing down existing institutions,
especially ones frequently touted as a public good, is a hard sell.270
In my book, The Feminist War on Crime, I trace how the
feminist antiviolence movement became entangled in carceral
politics:
In past decades, feminists were rightly concerned about
gender violence, and they made philosophical and strategic
choices about how to address it. These were hard choices.
They were contested choices. They were choices under
conditions of uncertainty, political pressure, and cultural
change. But it becomes clear that powerful feminist
subgroups repeatedly chose criminal law. Their reform
agendas expanded police and prosecutorial power,
emphasized criminals’ threat to vulnerable women, diverted
scarce resources to law enforcement, and ultimately made
many feminists soldiers in the late twentieth-century war on
crime. . . . [F]eminism shaped the modern criminal system
[just as] participation in the criminal system shaped modern
feminism.271
Of course, an extended discussion of the origins of American
carceral feminism is not warranted here. Nevertheless, the
carceral feminist story can serve as a cautionary tale for those who
believe prosecuting officers should be a foremost goal of the Black
Lives Matter and similar movements.
Feminists and racial justice advocates often imagine it is
possible to simultaneously pursue radical transformation of the
penal system and selectively strengthen that system so that it can
go after progressives’ identified privileged bad actors.272 However,
the feminist story reveals the distributional reality that “carceral
progressivism” rarely works this way. 273 Feminists invested
heavily and disproportionately in prosecuting individual men as a
means to gender justice, but this program was no panacea: it
harmed the many marginalized men who ended up jailed, landed
some women in jail, did not always reduce—and sometimes
269. Id.
270. Aidan Smith, No, Defund the Police and Medicare for All Didn’t Lead to
Democratic Losses in the House, APPEAL (Nov. 9, 2020), https://theappeal.org/defund-the-po
lice-medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/4EDZ-G43X].
271. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 6.
272. Id. at 10.
273. See Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 491, 529 (2019) (examining the phenomenon of “progressive reliance on
criminalization”).
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increased—violence, had the tendency to reinforce stereotypes
about women, and perhaps most relevantly, thwarted the
development of better methods of preventing and remedying
violence against women.274
Indeed, many equality-minded scholars believe that the penal
system becomes more just when privileged parties—cops, White
men, the wealthy—receive the same or harsher treatment than
marginalized defendants. However, in seeking to ensure that the
criminal law severely punishes apparently privileged defendants,
progressive activists and lawmakers often propose reforms that
expand the reach of substantive criminal laws, lengthen already
exorbitant sentences, and add to prosecutors’ already enormous
advantages in the criminal process.275 And, as I have said before,
“Rich and powerful men have the corrupt influence to evade even
toughened laws, placing the burden of increased criminalization
on the poor minorities who form the policed segment of the
population.”276
Moreover, experiments to provide “equal protection under the
carceral state” by ensuring that police, prosecutorial, and prison
violence is equally inflicted on marginalized and privileged people
alike have ended up as “one-way ratchets” that accrued to the
penal state more power over everyone.277 Right-wing lawmakers
justified deleterious policies like three-strikes and mandatory
minimum laws on the ground that they decrease ostensibly racist
judicial discretion and ensure defendants’ equal treatment. 278
Perhaps the most sobering tale of such efforts involves the federal
sentencing guidelines. In the 1980s, conservatives and liberals
came together to address racial disparity in criminal sentencing,
which they attributed to judicial discretion.279 Lawmakers quickly
settled on rigid, mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, which

274. See generally GRUBER, supra note 46, at 31–32 (discussing the effects of the Mann
Act, which criminalized human traffickers).
275. See generally Murder, Minority Victims, & Mercy, supra note 18, at 169–70.
276. GRUBER, supra note 46, at 10.
277. See Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1337, 1367–68 (2018) [hereinafter Equal Protection].
278. See, e.g., STEVEN J. IPSEN, ASS’N DEPUTY DIST. ATT’YS, THE REPEAT CRIMINAL
OFFENDER/THREE STRIKES FAIR SENTENCING ACT 1 (2006), https://web.archive.org/web/201
80331153648/http://caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/pdf/sa2006rf0005_amdt_1_s.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/YF29-QYND] (claiming to “provide a complete, proportionate or consistent statutory
structure for appropriately and fairly sentencing repeat offenders”).
279. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 164 (1995); Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly,
57 ME. L. REV. 569, 573 (2005).
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increased the length of sentences overall.280 It also turns out that
lawmakers simply codified their “commonsense,” politically
expedient, and inherently racialized notions of crime severity (i.e.,
crack dealing is worse than cocaine dealing). 281 In the end, the
guidelines created greater racial disparity.282
Still, reformers cling to the fiction that policing and
prosecution’s pathologies are the products of individual actors and
their discretion. “At the core of liberal law-and-order was the
promise to move each individual qua individual through a system
of clear rules that allow little room for individual bias,” Murakawa
notes. 283 This legal agenda “legitimized extreme penal harm to
African Americans: the more carceral machinery was rights-based
and rule-bound, the more racial disparity was isolatable to ‘real’
black criminality.”284 Racial justice seekers’ perpetual hope that
“reformed” criminal law and empowered prosecutors will lead to
cop convictions that ultimately improve policing—and repeated
disappointment and pain when it does not—is based on a
misunderstanding of the relationship between law and police
violence. Historically, criminal law enabled police violence, and
currently it has little capacity to control it.285
Consider, for example, the operation of law in the Breonna
Taylor killing. Far from prohibiting deadly SWAT raids, the
criminal law all but invites them.286 Courts and legislatures have
encouraged the police to seek no-knock warrants and raid homes
in the middle of the night based on the fiction that such brutality
280. Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science
of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005).
281. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1939, 1944–45 (1988) (noting the “general
consensus . . . among judges, lawyers, criminal justice experts . . . and scholars . . . that
sentencing guidelines were needed”); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1988)
(observing that the guidelines are not a product of political compromise but of the
institutional struggle to implement a consensus idea that sentences should be uniform);
Federal Cocaine Sentencing Laws, supra note 70.
282. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down mandatory federal
sentencing guidelines as violative of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee. United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 256 (2005). Recent debate has concerned whether Booker has
revived racial disparities. See generally Sonja B. Starr, Did Booker Increase Sentencing
Disparity? Why the Evidence Is Unpersuasive, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 323, 323 (2013)
(critiquing a recent Sentencing Commission’s report finding that Booker has increased
racial disparity as unsupported by the evidence).
283. MURAKAWA, supra note 5, at 18.
284. Id.
285. Butler, supra note 220, at 386.
286. See BALKO, supra note 251, at 157.
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is a necessary component of “inherently dangerous” drug
interdiction.287 In short, the police who kill during drug raids are
engaging in a style of search execution that has been explicitly
approved by courts, including the Supreme Court.288
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that police may
engage in this type of home raid even where there is marginal or
no probable cause. In Illinois v. Gates, for example, the Court made
it much easier for magistrates to approve of warrants based on the
relatively unsubstantiated claims of informants. 289 The Court
directed appellate courts to give “great deference” to “magistrate’s
‘determination of probable cause’” and adopted a nebulous
“totality-of-the-circumstances” test that freed magistrates to find
probable cause without a strong showing that the informant was
reliable.290 Justice Brennan dissented that these juridical moves
undermined the constitutional principle “of having magistrates,
rather than police, or informants, determine whether there is
probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant.”291 Indeed,
the Court has shown little concern over the “hydraulic pressures”
that lead magistrates to rubber-stamp police requests for
warrants. “Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law
enforcement team,” the Court insisted in United States v. Leon, “as
neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions.”292
In fact, however, judges regularly act more like partners to
police than a check on them. Balko cites survey evidence that
police widely “shop” for friendly magistrates and magistrates

287. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390 (1997) (citing People v. Lujan,
484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971)); 21 U.S.C. § 879 (authorizing execution of search warrants
seeking controlled substances “at any time of the day or night”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411
(2020), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-411 [https://perma.cc
/7SW3-SDQS] (allowing officer to enter a dwelling “without giving notice” if authorized by
the judge or magistrate issuing the search warrant); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 224
(2020), https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112376 [https://perma.cc/VG7C-HB8F]
(“The peace officer need not announce his authority and purpose when to do so would
imperil the arrest.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35-9 (2020), https://sdlegislature.gov/Statu
tes/Codified_Laws/2049044 [https://perma.cc/WJ5N-5V6A] (allowing magistrate to issue
no-knock warrant if notice would result in destruction of evidence or danger to officer or
others).
288. See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96, 100 (2005) (approving a SWAT
drug raid where police, at gunpoint, intruded upon a sleeping resident, held her handcuffed
in a garage for hours, and questioned her about her immigration status).
289. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241–45 (1983).
290. Id. at 230–31, 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
291. Id. at 285 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
292. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984).
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generally defer to the police on the need for a search. 293 In the
survey, “most police officers interviewed could not remember ever
having been turned down.”294 One Denver Post report on warrant
applications found that judges approved ninety-seven percent of
no-knock warrant requests and noted that “astonishingly, many of
the city’s judges would sign off on no-knock warrants even though
the police hadn’t requested one.”295 In fact, “about 10 percent of the
no-knock warrants were changed from knock-and-announce
warrants merely by the judge’s signature.”296 And remember, as
much as the law permits magistrates to defer to police on the need
for raids, the law also defers to the police on how to execute the
raid. SWAT teams using extreme levels of violence are simply
officers making their Graham-approved “split-second judgments”
that cannot be second guessed.297 Courts have created a virtual
legal presumption that the inherent dangers of drug interdiction
justify extreme violence, relieving narcotics raiders of the
obligation to provide any particularized evidence that the brutal
force was warranted.
People are right to be outraged by the drug interdiction SWAT
actions that culminated in Breonna Taylor’s untimely death.
However, it would be a mistake to see these actions as aberrant,
contrary to law, or a grave departure from “ordinary” drug
interdiction. The hail of police bullets that killed Taylor was the
final act of a formal, legally sanctioned police process all but
designed to produce tragedy. We can start with the search warrant
application. According to Detective Joshua Jaynes’s affidavit in
support of the application, the only connection Taylor had to
narcotics at all was that she happened to be friendly with the drugdistribution suspect, Jamarcus Glover, and police had seen him
leave her house on one occasion with a USPS package. 298 The
follow-up “investigation,” according to the affidavit, consisted
solely of confirming with the postal inspector that Glover had
previously received packages at Taylor’s house.299
293.
294.

BALKO, supra note 251, at 184–85.
Id. at 185 (quoting RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 27 (1985)).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
298. JOSHUA C. JAYNES, LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPT., JEFFERSON COUNTY,
KENTUCKY SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT: CASE NO. 20-1371, at 2 (2020), https://reason.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Breonna-Taylor-search-warrants.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6UQC22M] [hereinafter Taylor Affidavit].
299. Id.
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That’s it. That was the information. There was no positive
drug dog sniff of the package Glover left with. There was no
controlled buy implicating Taylor. There were no observation post
recordings of Taylor. There was no snitch—much less a reliable
one—claiming Taylor was involved in drug dealing. Instead, what
the affidavit contained was Jaynes’s speculation that “Glover may
be keeping narcotics and/or proceeds” at Taylor’s house because “it
is not uncommon for drug traffickers to receive mail packages at
different locations.”300 Of course, there was no individualized
information that such a dynamic was present in Taylor’s case.
In fact, Jaynes later admitted that he left out that the officer
who spoke to the post office inspector had “nonchalantly” told
Jaynes that Glover “just gets Amazon or mail packages there.”301
Why was Jaynes so wedded to his theory that Taylor must have
been receiving drugs for Glover? He later detailed his chauvinist
train of thought to internal investigators: “[Dealers] get other
people involved and it’s usually females . . . . It’s usually baby
mamas . . . or it’s girlfriends that they can trust. They can trust
them with their money and their stuff.”302 So Jaynes “didn’t go too
in-depth about [the Amazon remark] ’cause again, what I saw on
my own two eyes.”303
Clearly, Detective Jaynes, with his raced and gendered
assumptions that female acquaintances are complicit “baby
mamas,” was a poor guarantor of probable cause to search. But
what about the judge, Judge Shaw? She says she’s “concerned”
that Jaynes may have lied in the affidavit.304 Indeed, an officer told
internal investigators that the postal inspector said Glover had not
been receiving packages at Taylor’s house. 305 But even if Judge
Shaw had no reason to doubt the affidavit’s truth, how could she
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. Darcy Costello, “We All Had a Hand in This”: Louisville Cop Who Got Breonna
Taylor Warrant in the Hot Seat, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Oct. 7, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://ww
w.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/10/07/breonna-taylor-case-wh
at-cop-who-got-warrant-told-police/5912336002/ [https://perma.cc/D2QE-Q9C3].
302. Tyler Emery, Investigators Say Affidavit for Warrant to Search Breonna Taylor’s
Home “Should Be Reviewed for Criminal Actions,” ABC WHAS 11 (Oct. 7, 2020, 11:46 PM),
https://www.whas11.com/article/news/investigations/breonna-taylor-case/breonna-taylor-j
oshua-jaynes-lmpd-investigation-files/417-a3d39c7a-d76e-431a-be49-f7ca088e5128 [https:/
/perma.cc/F8KD-X8LZ].
303. Costello, supra note 301.
304. Andrew Wolfson et al., Judge Says She Is ‘Concerned’ Detective May Have Lied to
Get Breonna Taylor Search Warrant, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:18 PM), https:/
/www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/10/01/breonna-taylor-casejudge-concerned-lmpd-cop-lied-get-warrant/5883362002/ [https://perma.cc/5Q3P-PPE6].
305. Id.
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possibly have approved of the police invading someone’s home,
which even the most conservative members of the Supreme Court
have recognized as the quintessential zone of personal privacy, in
the face of such a stunning lack of probable cause?306 The simple
answer is because she had no incentive to do otherwise. In
Jefferson County, Kentucky, judges often hastily approve
warrants, scribbling an illegible signature on them. “On the vast
majority of search warrants—nearly 72%—the names of the
judges who approved them were illegible.” 307 So much for the
Supreme Court’s assurance in Leon of “judicial officers’
professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment.”308
Detective Jaynes’s ground for requesting that the warrant be
“no-knock” was no less flimsy and conclusory. The affidavit states
simply, “Affiant is requesting a No-Knock entry to the premises
due to the nature of how these drug traffickers operate. These drug
traffickers have a history of attempting to destroy evidence [and]
have cameras on the location that compromise Detectives on[]
approach to the dwelling.” 309 Notice, there was a lack of
particularized information about the practice of the suspects,
including Taylor, in this case. Notice also that Jaynes did not
bother to claim that safety required a weapons-heavy, kick-downthe-door type of entry. There was only his speculation that a drug
dealer might destroy evidence in the time between knock and
entry. And, if the issue was that Taylor might have a surveillance
camera, the police could have confirmed that before the
application. On the basis of this information, which did not include
one iota of individualized evidence on Taylor or justifying the need
for an intrusive entry into her home, “Judge Mary Shaw gave
approval for five deadly no-knock warrants in 12 minutes in
relation to the drug bust that Taylor had no involvement with, but
which cost her life.”310
Armed with a judicial mandate and plenty of long guns, the
search team stormed Taylor’s home in the middle of the night. Of
306. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
307. Jacob Ryan & Travis Ragsdale, Which Louisville Judge Let Police Search Your
House? Most Signatures Are Unreadable, KY. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 16,
2020), https://kycir.org/2020/09/16/which-louisville-judge-let-police-search-your-house-mos
t-signatures-are-unreadable/ [https://perma.cc/9PYR-4Y2U].
308. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984).
309. Taylor Affidavit, supra note 298, at 2, 5.
310. BET Staff, Councilwoman Claims Breonna Taylor Died Because of Judge’s
‘Shocking’ Handling of No-Knock Warrants, BET (June 22, 2020), https://www.bet.com/new
s/national/2020/06/22/breonna-taylor-judge-no-knock.html?cid=BET__FBPAGE___344133
0996&linkId=91519788 [https://perma.cc/UKR3-7MSN].
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course, if police were really concerned about potential for
destruction of evidence, they would simply have waited for Taylor
to leave her house during the day. This would have made
particular sense, given that the police admitted they thought
Taylor was a “soft target” who posed no danger and were not sure
whether children or animals would be present on the night of the
raid. 311 In the end, the police landed precisely where history,
culture, typical practice, and the law put them—at Taylor’s
doorstep, clad in military gear, and breathless to become “ruthless
killers” at the first sign of a threat.312 At that point, it would have
been surprising if the police raiders being shot at by Taylor’s
boyfriend did not elicit a hail of bullets from them.
Now, one might rejoin that if the drug raid practices that
terrorize thousands of Americans are aided and abetted by law,
law reform is the key to ending them. Perhaps an aggressive civil
libertarian litigation strategy and lobbying effort could rein in
some of the most egregious drug raid practices. To be sure, there
have been successful efforts to limit no-knock and nighttime
warrants.313 Judges are now feeling some counterpressure on the
rubber-stamping front.314 Activists have been calling for local and
state leaders to abandon SWAT programs, refuse military gear,
and revise drug raid practices.315 However, these modest successes
311. Laura Strickler et al., New Audio of Police Interviews Sheds Light on Police Probe
of Fatal Shooting of Breonna Taylor, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2020, 2:00 AM), https://www.nbcne
ws.com/news/us-news/new-audio-police-interviews-sheds-light-police-probe-fatal-shootingn1233183 [https://perma.cc/QY2B-7UT3]; Tessa Duvall & Darcy Costello, Police Interviews
Say Breonna Taylor’s Home Was a “Soft Target,” Suspect Already Located, USA TODAY (July
9, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/07/09/breonna-taylor
-case-home-soft-target-police-interviews-say/5406961002/ [https://perma.cc/89SG-FPG4].
312. In the midst of the gunfire, a “worked up” Brett Hankinson—the one officer
charged with endangerment—shouted “reload” and continued spraying the area with
bullets. Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Former Detective Brett Hankison Faces 3 Charges
After Breonna Taylor Shooting, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Sept. 23, 2020, 2:19 PM), https://w
ww.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/09/23/what-we-know-about-o
fficer-brett-hankison-indicted-in-breonna-taylor-shooting/5490411002/ [https://perma.cc/B
M32-K7V9].
313. E.g., Fouse v. State, 989 S.W.2d 146, 150–51 (Ark. 1999); Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 U.S. 385, 387–88 (1997). But see Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 458 (1974).
314. BET Staff, supra note 310.
315. E.g., John Aguilar, Aurora Becomes First Colorado City to Ban “No-Knock”
Warrants, DENV. POST (Oct. 19, 2020, 10:53 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/1
0/19/aurora-police-no-knock-warrant-breonna-taylor/ [https://perma.cc/W4NY-3LT2]; Jeff
Weiner & Tess Sheets, Orlando Police Ban No-Knock Raids, but Other Central Florida
Agencies Still Allow Them, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 24, 2020, 12:20 PM), https://www.orla
ndosentinel.com/news/crime/os-ne-orlando-police-no-knock-warrant-ban-questions-202007
24-5hkqe3nrvneupgt3ntyfzxxh5u-story.html [https://perma.cc/RY8F-FMEM]; Tanvi Misra,
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come from social and political efforts, not litigation. In any case, a
program to reform the laws and practices that underlie SWATstyle drug interdiction practices is not the program of prosecuting
select individual officers involved in these raids.
The officers who killed Breonna Taylor, like many killer cops,
are difficult to hold individually responsible precisely because they
exercise official violence—violence that has long been accepted and
even glorified by law and society. The individual criminal liability
question is whether, at the moment of the killing, the officer
reasonably feared deadly force.316 In the Taylor case, both killer
officers were shot at and one was wounded, conferring on them a
good individual claim of self-defense.317 Of course, the larger issue
is that the Louisville police should not be in the business of
invading people’s homes in the middle of the night and scaring
them into shooting at police who they (rightly) believe are deadly
intruders. Prosecuting individual officers who shoot back at scared
home-defending residents, even if doing so results in conviction, is
unlikely to change the practices that lead to such horrific results.
In fact, it may reinforce them by propping up the fiction that
extreme deadly violence is an aberration caused by deviant
individuals and not a mainstay of narcotics policing.318
Back in 2000, Angela Harris counseled that “ending pervasive
police brutality requires not simply more punishment for ‘rogue’
officers or a greater commitment to the vague idea of ‘community
policing,’ but rather a disruption of the entire gendered culture of
policing.”319 Now, twenty years later, scholars like Armacost warn
that “the current accountability paradigm—targeting the officer
who pulled the trigger—is actually hindering genuine progress in
decreasing the numbers of these tragedies, including those
motivated by racism.” 320 To be sure, the fact that racialized
brutality is part of the very structure of American policing makes
it unlikely that a singling out of a few sacrificial lambs, whom law
professor Kate Levine warns will likely be minority cops or cops
The Local Fight To Demilitarize the Police, BLOOMBERG: CITY LAB (Aug. 31, 2017, 8:33 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-31/how-cities-say-no-to-military-equip
ment-for-police [https://perma.cc/EV4F-5CF9].
316. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(1) (2020) (self-defense).
317. Jamiles Lartey, Why It’s Not So Simple to Arrest the Cops Who Shot Breonna
Taylor, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2
020/08/08/why-it-s-not-so-simple-to-arrest-the-cops-who-shot-breonna-taylor [https://perm
a.cc/N46G-8AAY].
318. Armacost, supra note 19, at 947–48.
319. Harris, supra note 148, at 804.
320. Armacost, supra note 19, at 910.
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who kill Whites,321 will have any meaningful impact on violence
levels.
Moreover, reforms intended to make it easier for prosecutors
to convict hard-to-get cops are mostly not specific to police
defendants and portend harm to the very marginalized criminal
defendants whom reform is meant to benefit. In previous writings,
I have argued that relatively privileged defendants do tend to
benefit disproportionately from doctrines of leniency (broad
defenses, sentencing discretion, diversion, etc.). However, ridding
the law of such leniency has the effect of harming all defendants,
the majority of whom are the worst off among us.322 Levine argues
that the cop-prosecution program includes a laundry list of
carceral, antidefendant laws and norms, many of “which have been
clearly and persuasively shown to increase mass incarceration and
to prop up the criminal legal system”:
In reaction to officers not being charged, or not being
convicted, many have turned to the techniques and tools that
have been central to propping up mass incarceration:
dehumanizing police defendants, suggesting new and
harsher substantive criminal laws, eschewing procedural
rights that contribute to fewer convictions, lamenting too
short sentences for those officers who are convicted,
lambasting prosecutors who are seen to excuse criminal
behavior, and insisting upon treating police as harshly as
civilians are treated.323
In the wake of Breonna Taylor’s killing, many reformers have
called for abolition, but not the abolition of policing, drug raids, or
SWAT teams. They call for the abolition of grand juries.324 As a
formal federal defender who practiced in a grand jury indictment
system, I bristle at this proposal. Now, the grand jury is not much
of a check—as goes the old adage, it would “indict a ham
sandwich”—nevertheless, many defenders have stories of grand
juries saving their clients from serious felony charges based on
flimsy evidence. Accordingly, most defense attorneys would prefer
that the law always require prosecutors—or better, defense
321. Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 38–39).
322. Race to Incarcerate, supra note 13, at 1006–07; Murder, Minority Victims, &
Mercy, supra note 18, at 159–60; Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
273, 309 (2015); Equal Protection, supra note 277, at 1365–66.
323. Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7–9).
324. Dahleen Glanton, Column: Justice in Breonna Taylor’s Death Fell Victim to “Lawand-Order” Politics, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/d
ahleen-glanton/ct-breonna-taylor-justice-20200924-xoxev3ywgrcq7bksehdzwlhj7q-story.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/F3VV-HB66].
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attorneys—to present defenses and exculpatory evidence to grand
jurors. 325 In a similar vein, after deadly police shootings,
commentators regularly call for revisions to the substantive
criminal law to make it harder for anyone to claim self-defense.326
I have previously shown how such reforms impact men of color who
constitute the bulk of homicide defendants.327
However, my main concern with the cop-prosecution program
is not distributional. It is possible that reforms that put pressure
on prosecutors to charge killer officers and create proconviction
rules will not disadvantage noncop defendants. It is possible that
they will not disproportionately jail rookie minority officers.
Experiences with other carceral progressive programs and recent
research of police prosecutions indicate otherwise, but it could be
that the cop-prosecution program will just incarcerate bad cops
without spillover effects. But my primary critique is that focusing
on the individual criminal liability of officers, like other
incremental reform programs, reinforces the dominant narrative
that racialized brutality is a failure of policing. Worse, it portrays
this failure as a matter of individual rogue actors. At this moment
in time, it is critical for progressive scholars and activists to stop
describing policing as a crime-fighting institution with some
fixable problems and find a new “language.”328
The idea that policing is the state program that provides
community safety is so naturalized that people of color residing in
the bluelined communities—even people who have experienced
police violence themselves—often support more, not less, policing.
To be sure, there is a long history of scholars, activists, and
residents alike characterizing the crime, poverty, and
destabilization in marginalized neighborhoods as a function of
“underpolicing.” 329 However, as Professor Monica Bell notes,
“Sociologists studying poverty and community life have long
325. See Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 18, 24–25); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should
the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOW. L.J. 825, 828–29 (2015).
326. See Levine, supra note 4 (manuscript at 25); Kenny Jacoby & Jessica Priest,
“Lawful but Awful”: US Self-Defense Laws Questioned After Breonna Taylor’s Death, USA
TODAY (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/202
0/09/25/breonna-taylors-death-raises-questions-self-defense-laws/3529543001/ [https://per
ma.cc/B4VU-YMKC]; Race to Incarcerate, supra note 13, at 973, 986, 1021 (discussing the
calls for reform after a neighborhood watchman with close police ties shot Trayvon Martin).
327. Race to Incarcerate, supra note 13, at 1003–04, 1006–07, 1011–13; see also Equal
Protection, supra note 277, at 1365–68, 1373, 1378, 1381–83.
328. See Meares, supra note 49.
329. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19–20 (1997);
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717–18, 1721–23,
1725, 1727–28 (2006); FORMAN, supra note 84, at 10, 29–31.
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provided evidence that even when people rely on each other to
survive poverty and social marginality, those relationships are
generally not sanguine, trusting relationships. Those
relationships are often unstable and destabilizing.” 330 For sure,
few residents of socially and economically precarious
neighborhoods endorse heavy police presence for its own sake.
They endorse it on the presumption that the police will solve or
improve the environmental problems that concern them. 331
Policing has successfully occupied so many parts of American life,
but perhaps its most stunning success has been the occupation of
the American imagination.332 We have yet to develop a consistent
vocabulary for the state provision of security services that does not
invoke “the police.”
Analyzing policing from an institutional perspective—viewing
it as a fixed institution of race, class, and gender domination that
maintains geographic totalitarianism and sustains itself through
a monopoly on violence—upends the notion that we can transform
the police into an egalitarian security provider. Liberal theorists
and lawyers have largely adopted an institutional perspective
regarding capital punishment, leading most to embrace abolition
over trying to racially equalize the application of capital
punishment.333 Empirical studies have shown that the racial bias
in capital punishment relates to victims, that is, capital
punishment is far more likely when victims are White than when
they are Black. 334 Accordingly, some argue that Black victims’
330. Bell, supra note 53, at 733.
331. See generally FORMAN, supra note 84 (recounting the history of Black responses
to crime); Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law, 39 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 74, 76
(2020) (remarking that that during the 1970s, “[Black] activists were concerned about
crime, but they were asking for social services, not just more police and more prosecutions”);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 822–26 (1999) (noting “[t]he
conflicting opinions among Blacks . . . about law enforcement strategies” but concluding
that “despite their opposition to neighborhood crime, most African Americans believe that
the criminal justice system is profoundly biased against them and do not trust the police to
fairly enforce the laws”).
332. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2568 (1995) (arguing that the
underenforcement view “assumes that the only response to crime is incarceration”).
333. Murder, Minority Victims, & Mercy, supra note 18, at 169–70.
334. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in
North Carolina, 1980–2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2011) (concluding that a study of a
twenty-eight-year period indicated that a victim’s race “is a strong predictor of who is
sentenced to death in North Carolina”); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of
Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization,
37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105 (1984) (conducting study of eight states’ capital systems and
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family members are deprived the “closure” of a death sentence.335
Progressives, however, have for the most part rejected the
argument that capital punishment can be fixed by distributing the
death “benefit” equally to Black and White families.336 They reject
that deadly punishment is a “good” to be doled out fairly and
instead “look at capital punishment institutionally—its
philosophical groundings, its larger effects on subordinated groups
and communities, and its place within an evolved global
civilization.”337 For institutionalists, disparities in executions are
not fixable but serve to “confirm the morally fraught nature of the
entire capital punishment enterprise.”338
We can take such an institutional view of policing, if not the
entire penal system. As an institution of violent domination,
policing cannot be reformed from within, and we should not
expend more resources on reforming it. In 2020, two Washington
Post reporters examined the five-year fallout from Baltimore’s
efforts to reform its police force beginning in 2015 after the death
of Freddie Gray. The reporters found that the end result was that
the police budget increased, even as police spent less time making
arrests for minor crimes (a good thing) and less time attempting
to solve major crimes like murders (a bad thing). In addition,
plain-clothed officers stepped up their harassment and
intimidation tactics, and police claimed ransom-like levels of
overtime. The journalists’ research led to the conclusion that
crime-fighting “failures” are the police’s bread and butter:

finding that race-of-victim discrimination “is a remarkably stable and consistent
phenomenon”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990), http://www.gao.gov/asse
ts/220/212180.pdf [https://perma.cc/6674-QEGZ] (synthesizing twenty-eight death penalty
studies and concluding that “[t]he race of victim influence was found at all stages of the
criminal justice system process” but “evidence for the influence of the race of defendant on
death penalty outcomes was equivocal”).
335. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT.
REV. 145, 149 (1998) (noting that black-victim bias imposes “important harms” by denying
Black victims’ families “the sense of closure and ‘justice’ that the death penalty affords”).
336. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death
Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 33 (2002) (detailing the death penalty’s sordid racial
history, including lynching, and opining that “[r]ather than executing more people, we could
execute fewer”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE
L.J. 2619, 2628–29 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
(1997)).
337. Murder, Minority Victims, & Mercy, supra note 18, at 134–35.
338. Id.; see also, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively
the Politics of the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1431, 1441, 1443–45 (1998)
(characterizing racial statistics as a weapon in the “arsenal” against capital punishment).
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Police departments, strengthened by their own problems,
have no incentive to actually change. It is hard to imagine
another agency that could use such an abysmal failure as a
sign of its necessity. Police will never give up power
voluntarily—so it must be taken from them by significantly
defunding police departments and reallocating the money in
ways that might actually curb violence and offer resources to
communities terrorized by police.
Police don’t believe in reform. Baltimore shows that we
shouldn’t, either.339

Such an institutional critique of policing, and the entire
carceral state, is a mainstay of abolitionist ideology, which is
currently experiencing a renaissance in progressive scholarly
circles. Dorothy Roberts describes prison abolitionist thought:
Efforts to fix the criminal punishment system to make it
fairer or more inclusive are inadequate or even harmful
because the system’s repressive outcomes don’t result from
any systemic malfunction. Rather, the prison industrial
complex works effectively to contain and control black
communities as a result of its structural design. Therefore,
reforms that correct problems perceived as aberrational
flaws in the system only help to legitimize and strengthen its
operation. Indeed, reforming prisons results in more
prisons.340
Recognizing that internal reforms and “alternative[]” programs
“become add-ons to the prison solution,” abolitionists like Thomas
Mathiesen warn that activists should support only “‘negative’
reforms” that “strive towards ‘shrinking’ the system.”341 Similarly,
the contemporary abolitionist group Critical Resistance draws a
strict distinction between “reformist reforms” that “continue or
expand the reach of policing”—prosecuting cops, expensive body
cams, more money for training—and “abolitionists steps” that
“chip away” at the penal state—refusing military equipment,
reducing police size, investing in housing and services.342 Professor
339. Baynard Woods & Brandon Soderberg, Baltimore Tried Reforming the Police.
They Fought Every Change., WASH. POST (June 18, 2020, 8:26 AM), https://www.washingto
npost.com/outlook/baltimore-police-reforms-crime/2020/06/18/7d60e91e-b041-11ea-8758-bf
d1d045525a_story.html [https://perma.cc/N344-LRB6].
340. Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1,
42–43 (2019).
341. Thomas Mathiesen, The Politics of Abolition, 10 CONTEMP. CRISES 81, 87 (1986).
342. Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, https
://static1.squarespace.com/static/59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/5b65cd58758d46d34254f22c
/1533398363539/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_CRside.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN2Q-JY
FZ] (last visited Mar. 12. 2021).
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Scott Holmes, for example, recognizes that “[b]ecause police have
played the role of enforcing social control of poor people of color, it
will be difficult to reorient this aspect of policing.”343 However, he
adds:
Until then it is important to strategically negotiate aspects
and terms of this social control to make encounters safer and
[fairer]. This might include minimizing contact between
police and poor people of color by deprioritizing enforcement
of laws which are used to target poor people of color.
Ordinances, which deprioritize marijuana where there are
racial disparities in marijuana enforcement, offer an
example. Also, agencies which stop issuing charges for tail
lights, tinted windows, and other non-safety traffic violations
have the effect of reducing racially discriminatory [stops].344
Let me indulge a somewhat odd analogy and posit that
policing is like the coal industry. It is an institution that needs to
be phased out in favor of better, less costly methods of providing
necessary services. Policing cannot claim a monopoly on
provisioning safety any more than coal can claim a monopoly on
provisioning energy. Policing cannot be divorced from racialized
violence any more than the coal industry can be divorced from coal
mining. Policing cannot be cleaned up any more than coal can be
sanitized simply by affixing a “clean” label to it. However, the fact
of the matter is that policing, even more so than King Coal, is a
deeply entrenched facet of American life involving real people’s
real lives. Concerned residents, without any alternative, rely on
the police for safety, services, and crime-solving. Employees within
police departments rely on their salaries to survive. Policing
cannot and probably should not disappear overnight.345
Still, clean energy has taken decades to gain ground and will
take many more to become the norm. The move away from policing
toward other means of providing safety, services, and crimesolving will come in fits and starts. Nevertheless, incremental,
“negative,” and “transformative” reforms are already occurring.
Consider, for example, the aftermath of the Floyd litigation in New
York City. The courts did not have the capacity to rein in policing,
but politics did. Mayor Bill DeBlasio came into office with a
343. Scott Holmes, Resisting Arrest and Racism—the Crime of “Disrespect,” 85 UMKC
L. REV. 625, 667 (2017).
344. Id.
345. See Bell, supra note 53, at 761 (“In the status quo, we have a large, ideologically
entrenched policing apparatus that seems unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Policing is
not just part of the traditional carceral regime—it has suffused or supplanted many of the
ostensibly non-carceral systems that are meant to provide social welfare.”).
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promise to reform the police, and with the stroke of a pen, he
essentially ended stop and frisk.346 Stop and frisks went from a
high of approximately 686,000 in 2011 down to roughly 11,000 in
2017, a ninety-eight percent decrease.347 Far from the city lapsing
into anarchy, New York’s 2017 crime rate was seventeen percent
lower than its rate in 2011.348 Already, cities across the nation are
making moves to replace the police with nonpolice crisis
intervenors for certain emergency situations. 349 Already, there
have been bipartisan federal efforts to end the pipeline of military
weapons from the federal government to states and local police
forces.350 A critical step in furthering all these and even more
ambitious changes is a shift away from the American imaginary
that the purpose of policing is crime-fighting. Scholars and
activists must resist this mythology that has been so relentlessly
fed to the public for decades and unwaveringly insist that policing
is an archaic, hierarchy-preserving institution whose phase-out is
long past due.
V. CONCLUSION
This is a moment of radical awareness in which people of all
races and socioeconomic statuses are decrying the brutality of
street policing and lamenting that the United States has the
ignoble distinction of the most punitive nation on Earth. This
moment requires activists, scholars, and reform-minded
346. See Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle
Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014
/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html [https://perma.cc/WK6Z-8B7C].
347. Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-d
ata [https://perma.cc/58HT-ZAFW] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
348. I arrived at this percentage by adding up felonies and misdemeanors in 2011 and
those in 2017 and calculating the change. See Historical New York City Crime Data, N.Y.
POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/historical.page [https:/
/perma.cc./R8B5-SAKN] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
349. Such programs have begun appearing in states like Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
California. See What Is CAHOOTS?, WHITE BIRD CLINIC (Oct. 29, 2020), https://whitebirdcli
nic.org/what-is-cahoots/ [https://perma.cc/L2UF-XX59]; Laura McCrystal, Philly Has Put a
Behavioral Health Specialist in Its 911 Call Center Amid Calls for Police Reform, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/news/police-mental-health-911-kenneyreform-behavioral-20201009.html [https://perma.cc/5R26-K3R3]; Mayor London Breed
Announces Roadmap for New Police Reforms, OFF. OF THE MAYOR: NEWS RELEASES (June
11, 2020), https://sfmayor.org/article/mayor-london-breed-announces-roadmap-new-policereforms [https://perma.cc/EE35-QVH4].
350. Catie Edmondson, Lawmakers Begin Bipartisan Push to Cut Off Police Access to
Military-Style Gear, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/pol
itics/police-military-gear.html [https://perma.cc/F4KD-L2S6]; see also Misra, supra note
315.
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policymakers to keep up the pressure even as the twenty-four-hour
news cycle moves on and to call for much more than the
prosecution of individual officers. This moment necessitates the
rejection of policing’s organizational structures and tactics that
are rooted in slavery, disciplining the poor and lower classes, and
suppressing workers’ demands for rights. This moment demands
nothing less than a total reimagination of how the state can justly,
fairly, and effectively serve and protect individuals and
communities. We can make real strides and ensure that six-yearold Gianna Floyd spoke truth when she said, “Daddy changed the
world.”351

351. Aris Folley, Gianna, 6-Year-Old Daughter of George Floyd, Says Her ‘Daddy
Changed the World,’ HILL (June 3, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-r
oom/news/500989-gianna-6-year-old-daughter-of-george-floyd-says-her-daddy [https://per
ma.cc/CS57-RVVD].

